6 ms·

AFAIK there is no curent, practical "encrypted VM" that can protect itself from the hypervisor. Homomorphic encryption can theoretically do that, but is very sl

AFAIK there is no curent, practical "encrypted VM" that can protect itself from the hypervisor. Homomorphic encryption can theoretically do that, but is very slow and unproven right now.

rdl 13y ago
There are tricks you can do with Intel TXT to trust only the CPU and cache (TRESOR is an example) http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresor http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresor It's missing a few elements you'd need to build a really awesome secure cloud, though. (actually, intel hardware was missing it)
- Nimi 13y ago
  I only glimpsed it some years ago, but I got the impression that "anything the vendor can do, the attacker can circumvent one level deeper", especially as a criticism of TXT: http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Wojtczuk_Rutkowska/BlackHat-DC-09-Rutkowska-Attacking-Intel-TXT-slides.pdf http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Wojtczuk_Rutk...
  - rdl 13y ago
    STM fixed that particular set of problems in 2010/2011. There are still issues with making all of this stuff useful, though.