5 ms·
add MFA to the check
by croes 13d ago
add MFA to the check
- deltoidmaximus 12d agoTo where, the site requesting the verification? Now it is no longer zero knowledge.
- croes 12d agoNo, to the ID to prevent abuse if the card get stolen.
- Spivak 12d agoWhich means the issuer has to be involved in every attestation and you aren't allowed to own/control your private key. The government shouldn't know if/how many times I use my ID—you would be essentially building a country-wide blackmail database since it's a near direct proxy for porn usage. And it doesn't even matter if it's true, people will assume it anyway. Your system effectively collects exactly the data ZKP is intended to protect. Which is a long way of saying "ZKP" isn't an answer to this problem because you can't actually have zero knowledge in a system where people have little incentive to keep their key a secret.
- croes 11d agoNope, your ID could work like a YubiKey with a fingerprint reader or you could add a OTP. No third part would know how often you use your ID. Why do people make up problems that are already solved? OTP and biometrics aren’t new security features and people don’t assume the government gets informed every time they use it.
- nullc 11d agoMy example is still just as good if the ID holder is complicit. But also, this on-device fingerprint MFA would presumably be fairly bypassable. E.g. just glitch the device to extract the private key. ... and of course all the power hungry / extra complex ZKP machinery means less resources spent on preventing glitch attacks.
- pessimizer 12d agoadd a different ID check to the MFA if that doesn't work, then add more MFA to that new ID check. Eventually it has to work, right? It's definitely worth doing infinite security in order to avoid regulating social network algorithms, because
- croes 12d agoTo prevent abuse add MFA to the ID. Problem if stolen cards solved and still zero knowledge.