So none of these are mandated backdoors, or weakening end-to-end encryption. They're examples of the intelligence services pursuing signals collection. Mandated

So none of these are mandated backdoors, or weakening end-to-end encryption. They're examples of the intelligence services pursuing signals collection. Mandated backdoors would be something like the the United States' (as far as we know) failed attempts to compel companies to insert code to allow third parties to enter and read their communications, or the UK's (as far as we know) long-postponed attempts to add ghost devices to Apple and Meta's e2e communication systems. I'm not so much asking as a gotcha, as modern examples of this kind of backdoor (or published encryption weaknesses) would be a big deal. I realise that there are many other tactics that states, especially the US, pursue that undermine privacy online. These just seemed weirdly specific to projects that the US has, in fact, failed to pull off for years: compelled insertion of code, and deliberately weakened encryption. (ObContext: I worked at EFF during the Snowden revelations, and worked on understanding the impact of PRISM, and Bullrun specifically.)