5 ms·
> https://www.csiro.au/-/media/Energy/GenCost-2025-26-Final/Ge https://www.csiro.au/-/media/Energy/GenCost-2025-26-Final/Ge... It is interesting to see how lar
by chickenbig 17d ago
> https://www.csiro.au/-/media/Energy/GenCost-2025-26-Final/Ge https://www.csiro.au/-/media/Energy/GenCost-2025-26-Final/Ge...
It is interesting to see how large-scale nuclear is handled.
120% and 60% increase in cost for FOAK and NOAK (Table 2-1), plus no learning rate for nuclear construction beyond that (Table C.2).
Interest rates during construction unfairly penalise nuclear as "GenCost uses the simplest way which is to increase the capital cost by the assumed discount rate raised to the power of the construction time" (page 97)." This results in ~20% increase in capital costs against other simple scenarios like equal construction costs across each year.
30 year plant lifetime, rather than say 60 years. That results in ~10% increase in capital costs.
> Those same fossil fuels have the same economic ”crowding” out problem when cheaper sources in the same class delivers.
That line of reasoning only works if there is something to make one plant more expensive to produce electricity than another. For natural gas the cost of fuel is far greater than the CAPEX. For intermittents only the variable OPEX can distinguish between generators, which is mostly for wind and I guess most severely for offshore wind. Cannibalisation is the big problem for intermittents. The notion of succession doesn't work for them.
- ViewTrick1002 17d agoNow you’re desperately trying to rationalize new built nuclear power. GenCost has an amazing FAQ section you evidently either ignored, or did not peruse. For example here they discuss economic life vs operational life, when you live in reality rather than grasping for straws: > Why is the economic life used in LCOE calculations instead of the fulloperational life? > The LCOE calculation converts all upfront and ongoing costs to annual costs which is then divided by annual production. The capital cost component of a technology is converted to an annual repayment to the debt and equity providers. The annual repayment amount is determined using the economic life and the weighted average cost of capital. The economic life is shorter than the asset life for some technologies such as coal, nuclear and hydro. Some stakeholders have queried why this is so. > Debt and equity providers require a shorter payback period than the total asset life for some technologies to avoid the risk that part of the equipment might fail or might need new investment (sometimes called refurbishment or extension costs) to keep operating safely and reliably. To determine the economic life, debt and equity providers might look to the warranties provided with the equipment. They might also look at the typical timing of refurbishments or life extensions for that technology. The economic life is an input provided by the engineering firm that AEMO commissions each year as an input to GenCost. > Some stakeholders suggested that coal and nuclear could access special financing arrangements to move the economic life closer to the asset life. However, our preference is not to introduce special arrangements for technologies where there is limited Australian evidence. A common approach to the LCOE calculation is important to maintain comparability. The 2024-25 report does explore the impact of longer capital recovery periods in Section 2. It finds there is no significant benefit from the longer operational life of nuclear relative to shorter-lived technologies whose costs have been falling over time. Even looking at China and South Korea they see essentially zero learning effects across plants after the FOAK build. Small ones at the same plant. Crying about FOAK vs NOAK is not even close to solving the absolutely stupidly large subsidies new built nuclear power needs. Again with the loaded terms. Sad. The market is limited until for example Jevons paradox expands it. Which will never happen with new built nuclear power due to how expensive the electricity is, that leads to energy poverty for generations instead. But I digress. Look at Texas or California. About all new renewable projects in those markets are coupled with storage. What you call cannabilisation, and try to paint like the end of the world, is simply the market working. Now pure renewable projects aren’t enough, instead you need to sell the electricity when the consumers demand it. In just a year or two storage has massively smoothed out the price swings in Texas. But again, that would require curiosity rather than desperately trying to poke holes the study already answered. Why are you so afraid of renewables and storage?
- modo_mario 17d agoNot him but. >For example here they discuss economic life vs operational life, when you live in reality rather than grasping for straws: It's essentially just saying the market can't think long term enough leading to drastic differences in your calculations. But hence it's typically governments pushing these projects forward. >The market is limited until for example Jevons paradox expands it. Which will never happen with new built nuclear power due to how expensive the electricity is But it did happen for nuclear power in the past. Now you see essentially the opposite. >Why are you so afraid of renewables and storage? I'm not. I think it's a great set of technologies. But I think if one tries to get to 100% everywhere one's going to stub their toes on the scenarios where it's not all roses. Why? Because the storage part is hard at scale in a lot of places and the intermitency more pronounced. In Texas and Cali are incredibly sunny places in the south of the US. Silicon valley where it's already an issue gets 3 times as much sunshine hours during winter as let's say berlin and those hours are far less usefull. >Crying about FOAK vs NOAK is not even close to solving the absolutely stupidly large subsidies new built nuclear power needs. Is this not intentionally sidestepping the ludicrous amount of subsidies that have been handed out to renewables in aggregate? Berlin would need to overproduce insane amounts in summer to handle it's winters.
- ViewTrick1002 17d agoThe flip side is that what you are saying is that nuclear power will be commercially viable into the 2100s. And betting the house on that. While knowing that the electricity they provide is expensive enough to lead to energy poverty for generations. That seems absolutely insane. Jevons Paradox did not happen for nuclear power. What happened was crazy cost overruns, cancellations and the industry collapsing into its current state. Who cares if we get to 95%, 97, 99% or 100% carbon neutral electricity when we still need to decarbonize agriculture, aviation, chemicals, industry, construction and so on? Don't let perfect be the enemy of good enough. Transition that final firming to whatever carbon neutral sources we land on when their emissions matter in the late 2030s and 2040s. We need to optimize decarbonization per dollar spent with the shortest time to market. You do realize that renewable subsidies are being phased out all over the world? They aren't needed anymore. Complaining about "equality" because your desired solution didn't deliver in time is a kindergarten level argument. We've spent the past 70 years subsidizing nuclear power. It just never delivered on its promise. The relevant question is: Where does Germany spend the next €100 billion today to avoid the most emissions? And that is certainly not new built nuclear power.