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A few hundred thousand dollars worth of tech replacing what used to be a massive industrial investment is amazing. And I thought enriching uranium is something

A few hundred thousand dollars worth of tech replacing what used to be a massive industrial investment is amazing. And I thought enriching uranium is something that counties with nukes go to extreme lengths to make it not accessible.

john_strinlai 22d ago
>And I thought enriching uranium is something that counties with nukes go to extreme lengths to make it not accessible. low-enrichment (~20%) is what's happening here. the bad stuff, for nukes, is ~90% enrichment.
- HPsquared 22d ago
  It's the same process either way, and the first few percent are the hardest (as it's super dilute so you need to handle a lot of material). It's much easier to go from 20% to 90%, than it is to get to 20%. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separative_work_units https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separative_work_units
- dopa42365 22d ago
  5% enrichment (regular reactor grade) is 2/3 the way to weapons grade already. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-c... Hence there technically being no enrichment cap for any country that signed the NPT and stuff (not to be confused with protection from US bombs or rogue states that never signed the NPT).
- leonidasrup 21d ago
  The 90% level is not a strict number. You can have nuclear explosion with lower levels of enrichment, but the total mass of the uranium is very large, therefor not a practical weapon. For example you need 100kg of 60% enriched Uranium-235 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Critical-mass-of-a-bare-metal-uranium-sphere-depending-on-the-type-of-fissile-isotope-and_fig1_366266734 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Critical-mass-of-a-bare-...
Legend2440 22d ago
>And I thought enriching uranium is something that counties with nukes go to extreme lengths to make it not accessible. It's not that difficult from an engineering perspective, the tech is almost a century old. It's just that we will drop bombs on anyone who tries. Nuclear nonproliferation relies on active enforcement.
- colechristensen 22d ago
  It's not difficult from a conceptual engineering perspective but it is difficult from an industrial scale perspective. It requires a tremendous amount of hardware and energy and precision equipment.
- KennyBlanken 22d ago
  Nuclear nonproliferation relies on surveillance/monitoring and statecraft. There are many, many steps before "drop bombs".
- yubblegum 22d ago
  > It's just that we will drop bombs on anyone who tries. I don't recall us bombing Pakistan, India, Israel, China, or North Korea. > Nuclear nonproliferation relies on active enforcement. The comedy hour at HN has arrived. See above ^^^
  - bawolff 22d ago
    >I don't recall us bombing...China As far as i know, USA was seriously considering doing this in 1964. However the soviets said that would mean war, so they didn't. North Korea is so firmly in China and Russia's sphere of influence that bombing them would be hard, especially given how much conventional weapons they have pointed at south korea. That said, would you really want to be north korea? economic warfare has done a number on them. in many ways they are the poster child for nuke != winning. Israel probably snuck through by doing it early enough and secretively enough that it was fait accompli. They probably tested their nukes before the nuclear non proliferation treaty was even signed. so really you have india and pakistan. The fact there are so few exceptions kind of proves the system works. > Nuclear nonproliferation relies on active enforcement. It relies on getting nukes being an irrational move for most countries. Yes part of that is your enemies will start preventive wars to stop that. A very major part of it is the economic consequences of developing nukes is usually not worth it. Part of it is the smart strategy is to just do most of the work and stop before getting nukes - if shit hits the fan you can get nukes quickly, but going up to the line without crossing it has none of the negative consequences.
jjk166 22d ago
It's actually the opposite. Centrifuges are a cheaper and easier enrichment method. A single uranium centrifuge is on the order of $10,000 to $20,000. It's economical to run lots of centrifuges, but you could in theory get up to high enrichment just using the same centrifuge again and again. Lot's of non-nuclear weapons states do have access, the Netherlands for example enriches more uranium annually than the UK. It's the components of centrifuges that are tightly controlled. Building enrichment facilities is well within the capabilities of pretty much any nation state, it's doing it secretly which is the hard part. This alternative technique only makes sense at extremely small quantities. For their primary market of making medical isotopes, it makes a lot of sense. For nuclear reactor fuel it's incredibly impractical.

john_strinlai 22d ago

>And I thought enriching uranium is something that counties with nukes go to extreme lengths to make it not accessible. low-enrichment (~20%) is what's happening here. the bad stuff, for nukes, is ~90% enrichment.

HPsquared 22d ago
It's the same process either way, and the first few percent are the hardest (as it's super dilute so you need to handle a lot of material). It's much easier to go from 20% to 90%, than it is to get to 20%. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separative_work_units https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separative_work_units
dopa42365 22d ago
5% enrichment (regular reactor grade) is 2/3 the way to weapons grade already. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-c... Hence there technically being no enrichment cap for any country that signed the NPT and stuff (not to be confused with protection from US bombs or rogue states that never signed the NPT).
leonidasrup 21d ago
The 90% level is not a strict number. You can have nuclear explosion with lower levels of enrichment, but the total mass of the uranium is very large, therefor not a practical weapon. For example you need 100kg of 60% enriched Uranium-235 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Critical-mass-of-a-bare-metal-uranium-sphere-depending-on-the-type-of-fissile-isotope-and_fig1_366266734 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Critical-mass-of-a-bare-...

Legend2440 22d ago

>And I thought enriching uranium is something that counties with nukes go to extreme lengths to make it not accessible. It's not that difficult from an engineering perspective, the tech is almost a century old. It's just that we will drop bombs on anyone who tries. Nuclear nonproliferation relies on active enforcement.

colechristensen 22d ago
It's not difficult from a conceptual engineering perspective but it is difficult from an industrial scale perspective. It requires a tremendous amount of hardware and energy and precision equipment.
KennyBlanken 22d ago
Nuclear nonproliferation relies on surveillance/monitoring and statecraft. There are many, many steps before "drop bombs".
yubblegum 22d ago
> It's just that we will drop bombs on anyone who tries. I don't recall us bombing Pakistan, India, Israel, China, or North Korea. > Nuclear nonproliferation relies on active enforcement. The comedy hour at HN has arrived. See above ^^^
- bawolff 22d ago
  >I don't recall us bombing...China As far as i know, USA was seriously considering doing this in 1964. However the soviets said that would mean war, so they didn't. North Korea is so firmly in China and Russia's sphere of influence that bombing them would be hard, especially given how much conventional weapons they have pointed at south korea. That said, would you really want to be north korea? economic warfare has done a number on them. in many ways they are the poster child for nuke != winning. Israel probably snuck through by doing it early enough and secretively enough that it was fait accompli. They probably tested their nukes before the nuclear non proliferation treaty was even signed. so really you have india and pakistan. The fact there are so few exceptions kind of proves the system works. > Nuclear nonproliferation relies on active enforcement. It relies on getting nukes being an irrational move for most countries. Yes part of that is your enemies will start preventive wars to stop that. A very major part of it is the economic consequences of developing nukes is usually not worth it. Part of it is the smart strategy is to just do most of the work and stop before getting nukes - if shit hits the fan you can get nukes quickly, but going up to the line without crossing it has none of the negative consequences.

jjk166 22d ago

It's actually the opposite. Centrifuges are a cheaper and easier enrichment method. A single uranium centrifuge is on the order of $10,000 to $20,000. It's economical to run lots of centrifuges, but you could in theory get up to high enrichment just using the same centrifuge again and again. Lot's of non-nuclear weapons states do have access, the Netherlands for example enriches more uranium annually than the UK. It's the components of centrifuges that are tightly controlled. Building enrichment facilities is well within the capabilities of pretty much any nation state, it's doing it secretly which is the hard part. This alternative technique only makes sense at extremely small quantities. For their primary market of making medical isotopes, it makes a lot of sense. For nuclear reactor fuel it's incredibly impractical.