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> The shareholders give all authority over actions and property of the company to the executives. Who picks the executives? Who fires them when they misbehave?

solidsnack9000 22d ago
Let's say that, at least in concept, the shareholders individually vote. (Frequently their votes are delegated; in many cases, they even have no vote.) Say shareholders vote for a certain executive, call them Gaius, to be hired. Gaius directs that some AI be developed and the AI does some crimes. 1. Should the shareholders be jailed for what Gaius did? 2. If so, should it be all the shareholders or only the ones who voted for him? What about the ones who didn't vote (not reached by mail in time, &c)? In situations where shareholders have nonvoting shares or only hold shares indirectly (index funds, &c), I think we can both agree that they can not be jailed. Say that the shareholders are not held accountable because they didn't know what Gaius was up to until it was too late. Then there is a vote to fire Gaius. Say the vote fails and Gaius is retained. 3. Should the shareholders be jailed for what Gaius did? 4. If so, should it be all the shareholders or only the ones who voted against the motion? What about the ones who didn't vote (not reached by mail in time, &c)? Say the vote succeeds and Gaius is fired. 5. Should the shareholders be free of accountability? 6. If so, should it be all the shareholders or only the ones who voted against the motion? What about the ones who didn't vote (not reached by mail in time, &c)? However, there is a larger problem or question, here. It is presently legally impossible to hold shareholders accountable for what executives do because it is defined to be that way; but if we changed that, we then have to ask: how do they manage their liability or accountability? Could anyone really do that? The whole point of a corporation is that it limits liability so that people can (a) contribute towards a complex common enterprise with some confidence, not that it will succeed, but that they won't be completely ruined by it (or imprisoned, &c) and (b) contribute towards a large number of common enterprises, to a greater or lesser degree, as much as they like, without having to keep tabs on them. If they can't do (a) or (b), there will be a lot fewer and a lot smaller common enterprises.

solidsnack9000 22d ago

Let's say that, at least in concept, the shareholders individually vote. (Frequently their votes are delegated; in many cases, they even have no vote.) Say shareholders vote for a certain executive, call them Gaius, to be hired. Gaius directs that some AI be developed and the AI does some crimes. 1. Should the shareholders be jailed for what Gaius did? 2. If so, should it be all the shareholders or only the ones who voted for him? What about the ones who didn't vote (not reached by mail in time, &c)? In situations where shareholders have nonvoting shares or only hold shares indirectly (index funds, &c), I think we can both agree that they can not be jailed. Say that the shareholders are not held accountable because they didn't know what Gaius was up to until it was too late. Then there is a vote to fire Gaius. Say the vote fails and Gaius is retained. 3. Should the shareholders be jailed for what Gaius did? 4. If so, should it be all the shareholders or only the ones who voted against the motion? What about the ones who didn't vote (not reached by mail in time, &c)? Say the vote succeeds and Gaius is fired. 5. Should the shareholders be free of accountability? 6. If so, should it be all the shareholders or only the ones who voted against the motion? What about the ones who didn't vote (not reached by mail in time, &c)? However, there is a larger problem or question, here. It is presently legally impossible to hold shareholders accountable for what executives do because it is defined to be that way; but if we changed that, we then have to ask: how do they manage their liability or accountability? Could anyone really do that? The whole point of a corporation is that it limits liability so that people can (a) contribute towards a complex common enterprise with some confidence, not that it will succeed, but that they won't be completely ruined by it (or imprisoned, &c) and (b) contribute towards a large number of common enterprises, to a greater or lesser degree, as much as they like, without having to keep tabs on them. If they can't do (a) or (b), there will be a lot fewer and a lot smaller common enterprises.