5 ms·
> Even in the Metaphysics of Morals, the whole concept of duty would be arbitrary if not in reference to rational beings. In what sense? There's a sense in whi
by woodruffw 25d ago
> Even in the Metaphysics of Morals, the whole concept of duty would be arbitrary if not in reference to rational beings.
In what sense? There's a sense in which there's no moral law without rational agents, but Kant himself is explicit about the "good will" being entirely independent of intended or obtained ends. In other words, no rational agent needs to benefit (or be harmed) in Kant's system for individuals to be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy.
(See GMS 4:394 for the "jewel" analogy, which is most popularly cited as evidence for Kant's position on this.)
- hliyan 25d agoI understand that this is the common (and perhaps the prevailing) interpretation, but my question has always been: once you subtract action potential and expected ends, what remains of the concept of "good"? We cannot simply end the inquiry by saying "good will" because it still doesn't clarify what it is that one wills. Disclaimer: not a Kantian scholar.
- woodruffw 24d agoI think the very short version of Kant’s view is that “good” is not impinged upon by any particular desire or action. What makes the good will “good” is that it operates in conformity with duty, and duty in turn is derived from reason (and reason is a property of our ability to self-legislate, i.e. give ourselves law without engaging in casuistry.) (GMS 4:397 and onwards for that.)