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Hence my qualification at the start. My problem with deontological ethics is that the justification of it abruptly hits an impenetrable wall, i.e. the rule or t
by hliyan 25d ago
Hence my qualification at the start. My problem with deontological ethics is that the justification of it abruptly hits an impenetrable wall, i.e. the rule or the duty, unless you appeal to some benefit or prevention of harm to rational beings. Even in the Metaphysics of Morals, the whole concept of duty would be arbitrary if not in reference to rational beings. But happy to be corrected.
- woodruffw 25d ago> Even in the Metaphysics of Morals, the whole concept of duty would be arbitrary if not in reference to rational beings. In what sense? There's a sense in which there's no moral law without rational agents, but Kant himself is explicit about the "good will" being entirely independent of intended or obtained ends. In other words, no rational agent needs to benefit (or be harmed) in Kant's system for individuals to be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy. (See GMS 4:394 for the "jewel" analogy, which is most popularly cited as evidence for Kant's position on this.)
- hliyan 25d agoI understand that this is the common (and perhaps the prevailing) interpretation, but my question has always been: once you subtract action potential and expected ends, what remains of the concept of "good"? We cannot simply end the inquiry by saying "good will" because it still doesn't clarify what it is that one wills. Disclaimer: not a Kantian scholar.
- woodruffw 24d agoI think the very short version of Kant’s view is that “good” is not impinged upon by any particular desire or action. What makes the good will “good” is that it operates in conformity with duty, and duty in turn is derived from reason (and reason is a property of our ability to self-legislate, i.e. give ourselves law without engaging in casuistry.) (GMS 4:397 and onwards for that.)
- aidenn0 25d agoIt's been twenty years since I read Kant, but it differs from utilitarianism in that it has no concern for utility of others, rather it's "if I could pick rules for everybody to follow, those are the rules I should follow. Ergo if I never want anybody to lie to me, then it is always immoral for me to lie -- anything else would be a contradiction, since it assumes two rational agents coming to different conclusions.
- hliyan 25d agoA good point, but (a) this merely sounds like a modification of the golden rule: do unto all others, without exception, as you would have done unto you, and (b) the rule isn't an end in itself because the end lies behind the "should" (e.g. why should someone not lie to me).
- aidenn0 23d agoI am by no means an apologist for Kant, but his ethics are clearly deontological, not consequentialist. He categorically rejected applying empiracism to ethics. Again, my memory is fuzzy, but I believe that Kant further argues that ethical rules are fixed, since any rational actor properly reasoning from first principles would eventually land on the same set of rules. It should not be surprising that contemporary ethical systems yield similar results in everyday situations because nobody will get published with their ethical theory of "why you should murder at least one innocent person per day."
- vintermann 25d agoIt's not about what you actually want in this case, but what you could want. It's impossible to want people to betray your trust, because if you wanted it then it wouldn't be betraying your trust. So that type of lying is strictly forbidden. You do not want to be deceived. But if include in "lies" such things as reading fiction aloud, then that can be permissible as you can want that: you aren't really deceived or betrayed.