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What mistake did I make? You've correctly pointed out how Markov models and modern LLMs are similar in a way, and how modern LLMs don't have full agency. But t

What mistake did I make? You've correctly pointed out how Markov models and modern LLMs are similar in a way, and how modern LLMs don't have full agency. But this doesn't rule out the possibility that Markov models are very slightly conscious in some human-like way. All information processing happens on matter-based substrates, brains and computers alike. I'll even provide a somewhat specific hypothesis: the pattern and temporal sequence in which particles such as electrons interact with eachother in a circuit dictated by an intelligent computer program may have physical similarities with how particles interact in a human brain, and certain patterns or temporal sequences of interaction may be responsible for consciousness. I'm not aware of any existing evidence that would rule this out. And inquiry about consciousness has always been trending downwards toward lower-level explanations over time. It might even turn out that solving the hard problem of consciousness is equivalent to finding a unified theory of physics.

txrx0000 28d ago
I should further clarify, this is a materialist stance. But it's the only practical stance to take anyway. And I will offer the explanation for why this is in first person language because it only makes sense that way. Take it and apply it to yourself: The materialist stance is taken not because I believe in a strict metaphysical sense that something like solipsism/simulation theory is not true (def true: as real as one's own consciousness), but because even if those were true, the materialist stance and its accompanying theories of modern physics would have the same predictive power regarding what I will observe in the future (well, sort of, at least until I wake up from a simulation, or something like that). I could be a solo mind, but this mind is dreaming of a material world that works according to physical laws, so even if I am a solo mind, I am having the same experience as a brain that exists in true material reality, so it doesn't make much of a difference (except when evaluated for the purpose of philosophical rigor and honesty to oneself). So "information processing is entirely physical" is strictly speaking an assumption, but it is a good assumption, despite it not having the same realness level as one's own consciousness.

txrx0000 28d ago

I should further clarify, this is a materialist stance. But it's the only practical stance to take anyway. And I will offer the explanation for why this is in first person language because it only makes sense that way. Take it and apply it to yourself: The materialist stance is taken not because I believe in a strict metaphysical sense that something like solipsism/simulation theory is not true (def true: as real as one's own consciousness), but because even if those were true, the materialist stance and its accompanying theories of modern physics would have the same predictive power regarding what I will observe in the future (well, sort of, at least until I wake up from a simulation, or something like that). I could be a solo mind, but this mind is dreaming of a material world that works according to physical laws, so even if I am a solo mind, I am having the same experience as a brain that exists in true material reality, so it doesn't make much of a difference (except when evaluated for the purpose of philosophical rigor and honesty to oneself). So "information processing is entirely physical" is strictly speaking an assumption, but it is a good assumption, despite it not having the same realness level as one's own consciousness.