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Many philosophers have questioned the scientific definition of "correctness". For example Heidegger who argued that scientific truth is an approximation and mea
by mburney 14y ago
Many philosophers have questioned the scientific definition of "correctness". For example Heidegger who argued that scientific truth is an approximation and measurement of things that we already presume to exist. These discoveries may be correct, and they may be true. But what about the more primordial truth (i.e. being) which we take for granted before we even begin a scientific inquiry? This is what he investigates, so pretty much all scientific definitions of correctness don't apply here. But it is very hard to convince followers of scientism that this investigation has any meaning, because they've already closed their minds to this form of thinking.
- mikeash 14y agoMaybe they'd be more open to these ideas if you didn't refer to them as "followers of scientism".
- dean 14y ago"These discoveries may be correct, and they may be true." This is the problem with Philosophy. You can take something correct and true, and disregard it. Worse, it is disregarded in favor of what is essentially an opinion.
- lutusp 14y ago> Many philosophers have questioned the scientific definition of "correctness". This concisely and aptly summarizes the reason for philosophy's low standing among intellectual disciplines. Philosophers are manifestly unqualified to debate the scientific definition of anything, much less "correctness". Beyond this, a suitable definition is too short to be of interest to a philosopher, someone for whom the number of words uttered is always ranked higher than the intellectual content of each word taken separately. A scientific idea is "correct" if it can be successfully compared to reality. How hard is that? I hasten to add that no scientific idea ever becomes true for all time -- all such ideas are subject to falsification by new evidence, by new comparisons to reality. > But it is very hard to convince followers of scientism... Ah, yes, the "science is just another religion" gambit. It speaks volumes about the depth of modern philosophical thought. Philosophers compare their ideas to those of other philosophers. Scientists compare their ideas to reality.
- mburney 14y ago> A scientific idea is "correct" if it can be successfully compared to reality. But this is similar to saying what is real is what corresponds to reality. Do you see the circularity here? The philosophers who engage in questioning the "real" are not doing it for the reasons scientists engage in discovering "correct" phenomena. The longing for a deeper meaning and clarity beyond scientific inquiry is a spiritual longing. These philosophers are trying to describe ways in which human beings fit in the world, how we can deal with the groundlessness of our existence, what choices we have in light of the anguish that comes from our mortality. The problem is that many people view this as a competition against science or "exact" thinking. It is not. I think this quote from Leo Strauss sums up my point: "Men are constantly attracted and deluded by two opposite charms: the charm of competence which is engendered by mathematics and everything akin to mathematics, and the charm of humble awe, which is engendered by meditation on the human soul and its experiences. Philosophy is characterized by the gentle, if firm, refusal to succumb to either charm. It is the highest form of the mating of courage and moderation. In spite of its highness or nobility, it could appear as Sisyphean or ugly, when one contrasts its achievement with its goal. Yet it is necessarily accompanied, sustained and elevated by eros. It is graced by nature's grace."
- lutusp 14y ago> But this is similar to saying what is real is what corresponds to reality. Do you see the circularity here? The circularity is in your wording, not in the thing itself. A scientist has an idea, one expressed clearly enough that two or more similarly trained individuals can understand the claim. The idea is tested against reality, in a way (again) that similarly equipped observers can agree that the result means what it seems to mean. The outcome is either that the original idea is supported by, or falsified by, the comparison to reality. And the distinction between the idea, and its test against reality, is nowhere confused -- not among scientists, anyway. > The philosophers who engage in questioning the "real" are not doing it for the reasons scientists engage in discovering "correct" phenomena. That's for sure -- philosophers much prefer arguing about the meaning of reality, to dealing with reality on its own terms. Many modern philosophers, following this trend, slide into deconstructive postmodernism without ever realizing that they've crossed the threshold of absurdity (by posing the argument that all experience is subjective and there is no objective reality as scientists claim, but without realizing that their argument justly applies first to the words they've just uttered).