6 ms·
There are a lot of long comments basically saying what I am about to say so I will try to keep this brief: Computation is a metaphysically universal and fundam
by Diogenesian 2mo ago
There are a lot of long comments basically saying what I am about to say so I will try to keep this brief:
Computation is a metaphysically universal and fundamental concept, since metaphysics is (tautologically) the domain of humans and we use symbolic communication. So of course very general theories of symbolic processes (e.g. Turing machines) are pertinent to the symbolic methodology we use to understand scientific processes.
But it is a fundamental mistake to jump from that to saying computation extends to a law of the universe. Computation reflects laws of the universe, but only in the exact same way that scientific and mathematical human speech do. The mystery (still totally unsolved) is how humans are able to intuitively understand space / time / causality / etc in order to define coherent symbolic rules that reflect real processes. That computers can seemingly always implement these rules having been given the symbols is of philosophical/scientific interest, but it's solipsistic to say it's a fundamental concept of the universe.
- jibal 2mo agoProve any of this. Or at least provide a cogent argument for it. To me it looks riddled with mistakes, like > metaphysics is (tautologically) the domain of humans which is frankly incoherent.
- andsoitis 2mo agoMetaphysics operates one level up from physics or the sciences, asking what reality has to be like for anything, including the sciences, to be possible or meaningful at all.
- jibal 2mo agoI know what metaphysics is (and your description isn't accurate--science is a knowledge-producing method that doesn't depend on metaphysics in order to be meaningful), but that has nothing to do with my statement. And it's called "metaphysics" because Andronicus placed that volume after the "physics" volume when he organized Aristotle's writings.
- Diogenesian 2mo agoScience absolutely does depend on metaphysics. Most famously: the validity of the scientific method is ultimately a metaphysical extension of our intuitions about inductive reasoning and causality. There is no scientific proof that the scientific method is valid. ("Our intuitions" is why I said metaphysics is tautologically the domain of humans. This is essentially Kant's philosophical legacy: science will describe what it does, but humans intuitively understand reality in ways that defy noncircular scientific description, and metaphysics must be invoked to have a rational and grounded discussion about these intuitions.)
- GoblinSlayer 2mo agoIsn't it obvious that scientific method is fallible? It's just statistically better than pure reason, which should be possible to demonstrate statistically. It's a product of trial and error, and there were many errors, I don't think there's much metaphysics there.
- Diogenesian 2mo agoThe problem is not that it's fallible, but that there's no noncircular explanation for why it seems to work. Inductive reasoning doesn't have a rational explanation, only an intuitive one. I don't think your claim is possible to prove statistically - what does "pure reason" mean? And of course it's "pure reason + empirical observations": even if they're not running reproducible experiments they still see natural phenomena.
- GoblinSlayer 2mo agoIt works because humans looked for a method that works, they tried different methods and chose one that works best, actually it gradually evolved over time. Pure reason is conjecture with little empirical input (and big intuitive or memey input) and little verification of output, i.e. a large deviation from empiricism.
- jibal 2mo ago
- peter_m1 2mo agoA related question might be, what's the difference between mathematical (Godel), computational (Turing,) and physical (Yang-Mills) undecideabilty/computability?
- Robotbeat 2mo agoThis is a misconception. It’s more fundamental than that. There’s a fundamental connection between (Shannon) information theory and thermodynamics. The Landau Limit, whether blackholes can destroy information or not, quantum mechanics, etc. Information is actually tangible. It’s not just an analogy or a coincidence that the word “entropy” is a word used in both physics and computer science (information theory). Thermodynamics, mind you, is perhaps THE most fundamental elements of physics and how the universe works.
- chermi 2mo agoDid you mean landauer?
- Robotbeat 2mo agoYes. Unable to edit it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer's_principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer's_principle
- Diogenesian 2mo agoInformation and computation are not the same thing. I was very specifically talking about Turing machines and other theoretical models of computation. That said, you are still making the same mistake I pointed out, elevating human symbolic information to a higher plateau than it deserves. I think it's because you're being too vague about the connection, when it's fairly mundane. The "fundamental connection" is that physical quantities are information, and on the other hand information is always a large collection of semi-independent semi-stochastic physical objects and can be profitably modelled by some sort of statistical mechanics. Information theory is relevant all over physics because human agents collect all sorts of physical information. The universe "doesn't care" about information in and of itself. Shannon entropy and Boltzmann entropy have similar formulas because they measure precisely the same thing; put another way, a goofy but formally equivalent way to model a gas would be a noisy radio channel communicating each molecule's kinetic energy. The problem with the black hole information paradox isn't that information is destroyed per se, but that it appears to be destroyed in a way that violates quantum mechanics (destroying quantum state without a measurement). The theoretically predicted destruction of information points to a more general problem. The Laundauer limit is no more fundamental to the universe than "a mechanical crane cannot violate the laws of pulleys." It says that no matter how you design your binary (or whatever) computer, it must involve an ensemble of binary states, and statistical mechanics puts an absolute floor on how little heat is required to alter such states. Whether these states are gas molecules or the written symbols "0" and "1" is immaterial.
- GoblinSlayer 2mo agoAlso Ramanujan summation.
- hitekker 2mo agoAgreed. I’ll also make an observation based on this thread: the idea of computation as a fundamental law is most believable (and desirable) to people who like computers and want to reduce reality to a computer. The belief is like a cheat code: somehow our tinkering and 9-5 job somehow grants us, the computer nerds, a deep understanding of life, the universe and everything. Deeper than scientists, philosophers, etc. It’s epistemic catnip and pretty tasty at that!
- deterministic 2mo ago[dead]