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Proliferation is irrelevant. It was not a Candu reactor what India have used and without Russia's help it's unlikely it would have happened. But there are easie
by Moldoteck 3mo ago
Proliferation is irrelevant. It was not a Candu reactor what India have used and without Russia's help it's unlikely it would have happened. But there are easier and cheaper pathways - uranium enrichment distributed to be stealthy
Related to US, it'll happen sooner or later https://www.nucnet.org/news/atkinsrealis-to-begin-licensing-process-for-canada-s-candu-nuclear-reactors-in-us-6-3-2026 https://www.nucnet.org/news/atkinsrealis-to-begin-licensing-...
- credit_guy 3mo ago> Proliferation is irrelevant I would not be so cavalier about that. > It was not a Candu reactor what India have used It was a heavy water reactor, called CIRUS [1], based on the NRX reactor that later evolved into the CANDU reactor [2]. > But there are easier and cheaper pathways - uranium enrichment distributed to be stealthy Iran tried that. It is not easy to keep centrifuges stealthy, you need tens of thousands of them, and they need to be organized in cascades, you can't have one here, one there. You need a few hundred here, a few hundred there, and you need conversion and deconversion facilities (of uranium oxide into/from uranium hexafluride). It is virtually impossible to keep such a program secret, the more distributed it is, the more people need to be involved, how do you keep a program secret if there are thousands of people working in those numerous facilities? [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIRUS_reactor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIRUS_reactor [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CANDU_reactor#Early_efforts https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CANDU_reactor#Early_efforts
- Moldoteck 3mo agoI meant it's irrelevant in the context of reactors not in general It's easier to keep them stealthy vs getting it from a reactor that operates under special conditions where Russia definitely helped, especially under current IAEA rulling