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MCP tools. We're doing some MCP bundling and giving it here, pretty cool stuff.
by jngiam1 6mo ago
MCP tools. We're doing some MCP bundling and giving it here, pretty cool stuff.
- ares623 6mo agowasn't MCP a critical link in the recent litellm attack?
- TeMPOraL 6mo agoAnd if it was? It's a bit like asking if "an API" was a critical link in some cybersec incident. Yes, it probably was, and?
- ares623 6mo agoi'd say it's more like intentionally choosing to use naive string interpolation for SQL queries than a trusted library's parameter substitution. Both work.
- TeMPOraL 6mo agoThere is no "parameter substitution" equivalent possible. Prompt injection isn't like SQL injection, it has no technical solution (that isn't AGI-complete). Prompt injection is "social engineering" but applied to LLMs. It's not a bug, it's fundamentally just a facet of its (LLM/human) general nature. Mitigations can be placed, at the cost of generality/utility of the system.
- discreteevent 6mo ago> It's not a bug, it's fundamentally just a facet of its (LLM/human) general nature Fair enough but then that means that MCP is not "a bit like asking if "an API" was a critical link in some cybersec incident" Because I can secure an API but I can't secure the the "(LLM/human) general nature."
- TeMPOraL 6mo agoMCP itself is just an API. Unless the MCP server had a hidden LLM for some reason, it's still piece of regular, deterministic software. The security risk here is the LLM, not the MCP, and you cannot secure the LLM in such system any more you can secure user - unless you put that LLM there and own it, at which point it becomes a question of whether it should've been there in the first place (and the answer might very well be "yes").