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I think this analysis is missing the big picture. (1) reducing oil shipments to China is good posturing for the US; hence Venezuela and Iran ahead of 2028. The

I think this analysis is missing the big picture. (1) reducing oil shipments to China is good posturing for the US; hence Venezuela and Iran ahead of 2028. These are shaping operations. China suffers more from these conflicts than the US. (2) Iran isn't the only one who can control passage throught the strait. All gulf countries can do so. If Iran can cheaply cut off passage, so can Saudi Arabia and UAE and everyone else there. They all have a long term mutual need in keeping this strait open. All these recent analysis of conflicts in isolation, which always assume a lot of self-interest in disliked politicians, seem to make the analysts and authors blind to a much more probable and sensible grand strategy. Russia invading Ukraine and failing, has been the greatest strategic gift Russia could give to the US against China in setting the stage for shaping a defence of, and deterring an offensive on, Taiwan. Russia lost the ability to defend its proxies at a cost asymetrically small to the US. Hamas broke rank and allowed Israel to eventually decapitate Iran's proxies and air-defense step by step instead of all at once, setting the stage for the opportunity of the current war. And Russia being distracted also gave the US carte-blanche in Venezuela, not only via distraction but by proving that Russian air-defense isn't the thread it was thought to be. The remaining strategic tension, in my humble opinion, is whether the US depletes its stockpiles too much without a caught up manufacturing capability, so that a Taiwan conflict becomes easy to win by default for China (via a blockade which would essentially be a cold war with few deaths and minimal damage) or if the weakened China (due to oil constraints) would be simply unable to attack in 2028, the strategic window when it can do so. The situation, in my eyes, is evolving in a state where only two modes become dominant and both are slightly better for Taiwan.

pibaker 6mo ago
> China suffers more from these conflicts than the US. You are missing the even bigger picture. Look back a few decades. The 1973 oil crisis was not just a temporary inflationary event, but the starting point of various technological and political investments that sought reduction in reliance on oil — engine efficiency regulations, nuclear power in France, early research into solar energy. The current war will likely have a similar effect. Suddenly you can't rely on imported fuel any more. And if you look around for alternative energy sources, Chinese solar and batteries and EVs suddenly look a lot more attractive than two months ago. And this is before you factor in the rest of the world reassessing their relation to the US and their confidence in the competence of US military and diplomacy.
dxdm 6mo ago
This is an interesting angle, and I could see how the prospect of reducing the flow of oil to China, and also to teetering democracies in Europe, might have occurred to the US decision makers as beneficial. However, the question is, how much reduction for how long, and how critical this would be for China. And the point remains that this operation has been started in a way that leaves the US in a weaker strategic position, not just in the Gulf, but also, crucially, in the far east. It has now become harder to contain China, both in the medium term by the reduction of US military capabilities both globally and in-theater by pulling out strategic defensive assets from South Korea and Japan; but also long-term, by putting themselves into a situation where they have to do that, retroactively, after painting themselves into a corner elsewhere, therefore undermining their posture as a credible, rational actor that can be relied on to oppose China's ambition in the region.
eaglelamp 6mo ago
China is not the only nation that depends on Gulf oil, all of SEA does as well. If the strait remains closed it will destabilize the region and diminish the prestige of the US, and with the US military focused on the strait China will benefit. Current US interventions should be read as a sign of weakness - an inability to shape events without resorting to naked aggression. Global hegemony can not be maintained through force alone.
regularization 6mo ago
> Russia invading Ukraine and failing, has been the greatest strategic gift Russia could give to the US against China in setting the stage for shaping a defence of, and deterring an offensive on, Taiwan. Amidst the US bombing Iran, blockading Cuba, slaughtering the president of Venezuela's guards and kidnapping him and his wife, and so on and so forth - US government talk on China can be removed from reality. So this point - Mainland China says it is the same country as Taiwan. The US acknowledges mainland China and Taiwan are the same country. Taiwan acknowledges mainland China and Taiwan are the same country. So this discussion of "invasion of Taiwan" means PLA troops in mainland China moving to Taiwan. Which could mean the Chinese navy moving into Xiamen harbor (a Mainland city!) and putting its troops onto Kinmen island which is claimed by Taiwan. Western elites have antiquated ideas, like talking about the rights the Britsh colonialists have over Hong Kong and other imperial nonsense. They brandishing their liberal ideals in their imperial machinations. But those days are over.
arrrg 6mo ago
It seems unlikely to me that this conspiracy (conducting a war intent on closing the strait while communicating something else) is anything more than a post-hoc rationalization. Obviously all actions the US takes have knock on effects elsewhere but those effects tend to become quite unpredictable and also weaker the further you are away from the place where the action happens. We could talk for days about the knock on effects of the Iran war and sort through them and how all the different actors in the world will react and whether that’s on balance good or bad for the US … but it’s all a bit cute, right?
JumpCrisscross 6mo ago
> the strategic window when it can do so What's the latest thinking on the 2028 window?
tw1984 6mo ago
love your very cute assumption that China is going to sit there and do nothing. you must be living in the Disneyland?
- ux266478 6mo ago
  China's foreign policy has been rooted in non-interventionism since the time of Jiang. The only thing happening is Disneyland is belief that this is going to change because gas prices spiked above 10RMB/L
  - tw1984 6mo ago
    non-interventionism of letting your oil supply to be cut off? life must be great in your lala land
  - deleted 6mo ago
    [deleted]
- JumpCrisscross 6mo ago
  > assumption that China is going to sit there and do nothing One of the few advantages this war might bring would be China letting American radars paint its kit.
- prohobo 6mo ago
  Is this some kind of astroturfing comment? China is supporting Iran and Russia economically and technologically, and is preparing for a Taiwan invasion.
rawgabbit 6mo ago
The continued stalemate will likely continue in my opinion. Continued daily strikes by the US and Iran squeezing the strait. China is severely squeezed by loss of oil. Russia benefits from rising oil prices. Everyone else will get to relive the 1970s. Stagflation here we come.
- YZF 6mo ago
  I don't think Iran can take a sustained air campaign for that long. They talk like they can but they can't. The only thing they have right now is their remaining ballistic missile (and to some extent) drone launch capabilities but that is going to keep getting degraded. The US being a net exporter of oil should benefit from higher oil prices. Defense contractors will also benefit. The 1970's were probably better than these days. ;)
  - eagleal 6mo ago
    > I don't think Iran can take a sustained air campaign for that long Most probably, but Israel and US are now being more conservative with interceptor targets though so that seems to go both ways.
  - rawgabbit 6mo ago
    I hope you are right. My concern is that the Iranian regime is a lot tougher than we may think.
- mememememememo 6mo ago
  Upside: Maybe helps a tiny bit on climate change.
scarier 6mo ago
(1) Why do you think this is worse for the Chinese government than the US? Also, this view of the strategic goals of the war seems fundamentally incompatible with both how it began and the ongoing US government narratives about it. (2) I think we all (the author included) agree with you that it's easier to break things than to build them--both hardware and relationships--so it's obvious that maintaining trade through these kinds of choke points requires some degree of cooperation on all fronts. Iran does have a geographic advantage over other players, though (partial exceptions to Oman and the UAE), as well as a clear acute interest in constricting traffic through the strait. Sure, it may be bleeding them, but it seems to be one of the few ways they can meaningfully attack their enemies. It'll be interesting to see if anyone has the will to force the strait open against Iran's efforts. Generally agree on Ukraine/Taiwan and the bigger geopolitical picture though.
- AYBABTME 6mo ago
  (1) China is more sensitive to shipping and oil shipments (and derivatives) than the US. It hurts both but China much more. The US is hurt in so far as high gas price are bad for elections, a small price to pay for strategic advantage. (2) Iran has a temporary but unsustainable interest in constricting traffic, and it's not the only country who could impose a filter there. The mere credible threat of a strike on shipping is enough to stop it, so other countries basically have an equivalent capability to restrict traffic. And all countries, including Iran, are unable to sustain a prolonged closure. The current situation is an unstable, non-equilibrium situation for Iran and it's neighbors. Overall, all of it doesn't really matter to the US because simply taking Iran off the supply chain of China is good for them. They spin the narrative about starting the war for a variety of other reasons so that they can justify the pain it inflicts on their allies (Korea, Japan - very dependent on those hydrocarbons too, and EU) and choke China's oil supplies without looking intentional. Last time the US overtly blockaded an asian nation's oil supplies, Pearl Harbour happened. Which is another reason why China had such a structural incentive to move toward solar power, battery storage and renewables in general while also powering most of their early growth with dirty power plants. I think Trump wants to be remembered for having neutered the China threat and having restored American supremacy and dynamism, and doesn't care too much about what it will cost at the next federal elections. I think he cares more about his legacy and wanting to be remembered as a historical figure on the strategic level. He's portrayed as being merely a fool with self interested dictatorial tendencies but I think attributing such simple intentions to him is self deception and leads to poor analysis. It doesn't pay to trivialize figures for disliking them or their actions. Without taking camp here, I'll say that taking Trump for a fool is shortsighted, in my opinion.
miek 6mo ago
Exactly. ~90% of Iran's crude went to China. The oil revenue was ~75% of Iran's budget. Iran has been a significant area of military development for China, serving somewhat as a forward base.
- cbsmith 6mo ago
  That doesn't exactly limit the impact of cutting off the supply. It's a global trade market. If China buys on the global market from other places instead of Iran because that oil isn't available, that still creates a shortage for everyone and that still pushes up the price of oil for everyone.
  - lmm 6mo ago
    Sure. But the US has substantial domestic production. So China (and everyone else who has to import the majority of their oil) gets hurt more.
    - cbsmith 6mo ago
      Short term, you might be right. However... higher oil prices also increase energy prices across the board, and China's energy sector is dominant in renewables. I think they're more than happy to have the competing energy sources become even more expensive.
    - cbsmith 6mo ago
      ...and of course the US has a lot of other industries that are hurt by this: https://www.npr.org/2026/03/26/g-s1-115240/iran-war-strait-hormuz-fertilizer-exports-farmers-planting-season https://www.npr.org/2026/03/26/g-s1-115240/iran-war-strait-h...
    - appointment 6mo ago
      The US oil companies will export their oil to China (or Japan, South Korea and other major oil importers, in lieu of oil bought by China.)
YZF 6mo ago
I agree. He's missing a lot. If the US ends up with some measure of success this is a big counter to China and Russia. Is this some sort of 4D chess by Donald Trump. Probably not. But it can still have good outcomes. Are there risks? Sure. "I am not, of course, an expert on the region nor do I have access to any special information, so I am going to treat that all with a high degree of uncertainty." - Then proceeds to tell us about the Iranian regime and other things he is not an expert on. - Iran's conflict with the US didn't start in June 2025. While it had its ebbs and flows Iran has been in conflict with the US since the Islamic Revolution. - Iran has been helping Russia in its war with Ukraine. That does have strategic implications to the US. So it's not true that Iran does not matter strategically. Those Shaed drones are flying into Ukraine by the thousands. - Iran has supported the Houthis in Yemen (which effectively can close the Suez Canal traffic when they feel like it) and has levers on Saudi Arabia both directly and indirectly through Yemen. Another strategic lever. - The whole comparison to Iraq's ground war is completely irrelevant. Iran and Iraq are very different countries with very different history and this conflict is very different in many ways. The US is not going to invade and conquer Iran. - If Iran has made so much trouble over the years without ICBMs and nuclear weapons should we just wait for them to acquire these technologies? What do we think about the rationality of this regime vs. the North Korean one? Is North Korea really the right analogy? "Iran was not a major strategic priority" maybe add yet? When it becomes a major strategic priority with ICBMs and nuclear weapons then what? Nobody knows where this war will end. Did the US have to go to war now? Probably not. Was there an opportunity between the internal unrest, the massacre of Iranian civilians, the intelligence and military superiority. Yes. What would the outcome be of not going to war? What's the certainty of that outcome? I don't think a nuclear Iran with ICBMs would be a good thing for the world and they would definitely go there.
jmyeet 6mo ago
The tl;dr here is, with all due respect, that your premises are basically all wrong. > (1) reducing oil shipments to China is good posturing for the US No, it isn't. For several reasons: 1. China has stockpiled ~1.4 billion barrels of oil. it'a net importer. Supplies from Russia aren't disrupted. At present, Iranian oil is still gointg to China; 2. China is rapidly decreasing its dependence on fossil fuels with renewable energy projects on a scale where they're building more solar, for example, than the rest of the world combined. They also produce those panels so there's no supply chain risk there; 3. While the US is a net oil exporter, it's not universal. California, for example, has no pipelines so 75% of its oil comes from the sea. ~20-25% of that comes from Iraq and is disrupted by the Strait being closed; 4. Qatar produces 20-30% of the world's Helium supply and ~20% of the world's LNG, both of which are disrupted; 5. ~30% of the world's fertilizer is disrupted by the Strait being closed. The US is way more impacted by fertilizer disruption than China is. > (2) Iran isn't the only one who can control passage throught the strait. All gulf countries can do so. The other Gulf states are US client states. Why would Saudi Arabia close the Strait, which especially hurts US interests? I also doubt any of them can to the same degree. The entire Iranian military is geared towards this strategy with drone and ballistic missile production on a scale no other country is really built for. It has hardened military infrastructure designed for decades to resist US bombardment. Other Gulf states don't have this hardened infrastructure and are more vulernable to Iranian attack if it came down to it. Take desalination plants as an example. Yes Iran has those too but Iran also has significant snow melt as a source of water, Mountains, remember? Iran has ski resorts they have that much snow. > Russia invading Ukraine and failing Russia has basically succeeded. You have fairly stagnant battle lines where neither side can particularly advance but Russia holds certain Ukrainian territory now for years. Russia is just going to wait for the West to get bored and give up. Russia's economy has proven itself to be surprisingly resilient. Sanctions just don't work on enemies like Iran, Russia or North Korea as well as they do on allies or former allies because enemies have an entire national project to resist American imperialism. They have to be self-reliant in a way that allies just don't. This is also why the US client states in the Gulf are hurting way more from the Strait being closed: their economies aren't built for it. Iran's is. > ... the weakened China (due to oil constraints) would be simply unable to attack in 2028, the strategic window when it can do so. So this is where you've really gone off the deep end. China is less affected by this, in part because of long-term strategy but short-term because Chinese shipments are still going through the Strait. American imperialists (which is both Republicans and Demorats, for the record) have this weird idea that China will invade Taiwan. Or wants to. Or it can. None of those things are true. It really feels like projection, like every accusation is a confession. China must be doing violent imperialism because that's what the US is doing. China can blockade Taiwan but that won't really do anything any more than an aerial bombardment will do anything to Iran. China doesn't have the amphibious capability to land an invasion on Taiwan any more than the US does in Iran. If you think otherwise, I'm sorry but you're gorssly mistaken. But all of that ignores the real issue: China doesn't need to invade (or blockade) Taiwan. Why? Because all but ~10 countries in the world already view Taiwan as part of China. In the US (and Europe) it's called the One China policy. It is US government policy and consistent across both parties. Why would China upset the international order when everybody already agrees with them?

pibaker 6mo ago

> China suffers more from these conflicts than the US. You are missing the even bigger picture. Look back a few decades. The 1973 oil crisis was not just a temporary inflationary event, but the starting point of various technological and political investments that sought reduction in reliance on oil — engine efficiency regulations, nuclear power in France, early research into solar energy. The current war will likely have a similar effect. Suddenly you can't rely on imported fuel any more. And if you look around for alternative energy sources, Chinese solar and batteries and EVs suddenly look a lot more attractive than two months ago. And this is before you factor in the rest of the world reassessing their relation to the US and their confidence in the competence of US military and diplomacy.

dxdm 6mo ago

This is an interesting angle, and I could see how the prospect of reducing the flow of oil to China, and also to teetering democracies in Europe, might have occurred to the US decision makers as beneficial. However, the question is, how much reduction for how long, and how critical this would be for China. And the point remains that this operation has been started in a way that leaves the US in a weaker strategic position, not just in the Gulf, but also, crucially, in the far east. It has now become harder to contain China, both in the medium term by the reduction of US military capabilities both globally and in-theater by pulling out strategic defensive assets from South Korea and Japan; but also long-term, by putting themselves into a situation where they have to do that, retroactively, after painting themselves into a corner elsewhere, therefore undermining their posture as a credible, rational actor that can be relied on to oppose China's ambition in the region.

eaglelamp 6mo ago

China is not the only nation that depends on Gulf oil, all of SEA does as well. If the strait remains closed it will destabilize the region and diminish the prestige of the US, and with the US military focused on the strait China will benefit. Current US interventions should be read as a sign of weakness - an inability to shape events without resorting to naked aggression. Global hegemony can not be maintained through force alone.

regularization 6mo ago

> Russia invading Ukraine and failing, has been the greatest strategic gift Russia could give to the US against China in setting the stage for shaping a defence of, and deterring an offensive on, Taiwan. Amidst the US bombing Iran, blockading Cuba, slaughtering the president of Venezuela's guards and kidnapping him and his wife, and so on and so forth - US government talk on China can be removed from reality. So this point - Mainland China says it is the same country as Taiwan. The US acknowledges mainland China and Taiwan are the same country. Taiwan acknowledges mainland China and Taiwan are the same country. So this discussion of "invasion of Taiwan" means PLA troops in mainland China moving to Taiwan. Which could mean the Chinese navy moving into Xiamen harbor (a Mainland city!) and putting its troops onto Kinmen island which is claimed by Taiwan. Western elites have antiquated ideas, like talking about the rights the Britsh colonialists have over Hong Kong and other imperial nonsense. They brandishing their liberal ideals in their imperial machinations. But those days are over.

arrrg 6mo ago

It seems unlikely to me that this conspiracy (conducting a war intent on closing the strait while communicating something else) is anything more than a post-hoc rationalization. Obviously all actions the US takes have knock on effects elsewhere but those effects tend to become quite unpredictable and also weaker the further you are away from the place where the action happens. We could talk for days about the knock on effects of the Iran war and sort through them and how all the different actors in the world will react and whether that’s on balance good or bad for the US … but it’s all a bit cute, right?

JumpCrisscross 6mo ago

> the strategic window when it can do so What's the latest thinking on the 2028 window?

tw1984 6mo ago

love your very cute assumption that China is going to sit there and do nothing. you must be living in the Disneyland?

ux266478 6mo ago
China's foreign policy has been rooted in non-interventionism since the time of Jiang. The only thing happening is Disneyland is belief that this is going to change because gas prices spiked above 10RMB/L
- tw1984 6mo ago
  non-interventionism of letting your oil supply to be cut off? life must be great in your lala land
- deleted 6mo ago
  [deleted]
JumpCrisscross 6mo ago
> assumption that China is going to sit there and do nothing One of the few advantages this war might bring would be China letting American radars paint its kit.
prohobo 6mo ago
Is this some kind of astroturfing comment? China is supporting Iran and Russia economically and technologically, and is preparing for a Taiwan invasion.

rawgabbit 6mo ago

The continued stalemate will likely continue in my opinion. Continued daily strikes by the US and Iran squeezing the strait. China is severely squeezed by loss of oil. Russia benefits from rising oil prices. Everyone else will get to relive the 1970s. Stagflation here we come.

YZF 6mo ago
I don't think Iran can take a sustained air campaign for that long. They talk like they can but they can't. The only thing they have right now is their remaining ballistic missile (and to some extent) drone launch capabilities but that is going to keep getting degraded. The US being a net exporter of oil should benefit from higher oil prices. Defense contractors will also benefit. The 1970's were probably better than these days. ;)
- eagleal 6mo ago
  > I don't think Iran can take a sustained air campaign for that long Most probably, but Israel and US are now being more conservative with interceptor targets though so that seems to go both ways.
- rawgabbit 6mo ago
  I hope you are right. My concern is that the Iranian regime is a lot tougher than we may think.
mememememememo 6mo ago
Upside: Maybe helps a tiny bit on climate change.

scarier 6mo ago

(1) Why do you think this is worse for the Chinese government than the US? Also, this view of the strategic goals of the war seems fundamentally incompatible with both how it began and the ongoing US government narratives about it. (2) I think we all (the author included) agree with you that it's easier to break things than to build them--both hardware and relationships--so it's obvious that maintaining trade through these kinds of choke points requires some degree of cooperation on all fronts. Iran does have a geographic advantage over other players, though (partial exceptions to Oman and the UAE), as well as a clear acute interest in constricting traffic through the strait. Sure, it may be bleeding them, but it seems to be one of the few ways they can meaningfully attack their enemies. It'll be interesting to see if anyone has the will to force the strait open against Iran's efforts. Generally agree on Ukraine/Taiwan and the bigger geopolitical picture though.

AYBABTME 6mo ago
(1) China is more sensitive to shipping and oil shipments (and derivatives) than the US. It hurts both but China much more. The US is hurt in so far as high gas price are bad for elections, a small price to pay for strategic advantage. (2) Iran has a temporary but unsustainable interest in constricting traffic, and it's not the only country who could impose a filter there. The mere credible threat of a strike on shipping is enough to stop it, so other countries basically have an equivalent capability to restrict traffic. And all countries, including Iran, are unable to sustain a prolonged closure. The current situation is an unstable, non-equilibrium situation for Iran and it's neighbors. Overall, all of it doesn't really matter to the US because simply taking Iran off the supply chain of China is good for them. They spin the narrative about starting the war for a variety of other reasons so that they can justify the pain it inflicts on their allies (Korea, Japan - very dependent on those hydrocarbons too, and EU) and choke China's oil supplies without looking intentional. Last time the US overtly blockaded an asian nation's oil supplies, Pearl Harbour happened. Which is another reason why China had such a structural incentive to move toward solar power, battery storage and renewables in general while also powering most of their early growth with dirty power plants. I think Trump wants to be remembered for having neutered the China threat and having restored American supremacy and dynamism, and doesn't care too much about what it will cost at the next federal elections. I think he cares more about his legacy and wanting to be remembered as a historical figure on the strategic level. He's portrayed as being merely a fool with self interested dictatorial tendencies but I think attributing such simple intentions to him is self deception and leads to poor analysis. It doesn't pay to trivialize figures for disliking them or their actions. Without taking camp here, I'll say that taking Trump for a fool is shortsighted, in my opinion.

miek 6mo ago

Exactly. ~90% of Iran's crude went to China. The oil revenue was ~75% of Iran's budget. Iran has been a significant area of military development for China, serving somewhat as a forward base.

cbsmith 6mo ago
That doesn't exactly limit the impact of cutting off the supply. It's a global trade market. If China buys on the global market from other places instead of Iran because that oil isn't available, that still creates a shortage for everyone and that still pushes up the price of oil for everyone.
- lmm 6mo ago
  Sure. But the US has substantial domestic production. So China (and everyone else who has to import the majority of their oil) gets hurt more.
  - cbsmith 6mo ago
    Short term, you might be right. However... higher oil prices also increase energy prices across the board, and China's energy sector is dominant in renewables. I think they're more than happy to have the competing energy sources become even more expensive.
  - cbsmith 6mo ago
    ...and of course the US has a lot of other industries that are hurt by this: https://www.npr.org/2026/03/26/g-s1-115240/iran-war-strait-hormuz-fertilizer-exports-farmers-planting-season https://www.npr.org/2026/03/26/g-s1-115240/iran-war-strait-h...
  - appointment 6mo ago
    The US oil companies will export their oil to China (or Japan, South Korea and other major oil importers, in lieu of oil bought by China.)

YZF 6mo ago

I agree. He's missing a lot. If the US ends up with some measure of success this is a big counter to China and Russia. Is this some sort of 4D chess by Donald Trump. Probably not. But it can still have good outcomes. Are there risks? Sure. "I am not, of course, an expert on the region nor do I have access to any special information, so I am going to treat that all with a high degree of uncertainty." - Then proceeds to tell us about the Iranian regime and other things he is not an expert on. - Iran's conflict with the US didn't start in June 2025. While it had its ebbs and flows Iran has been in conflict with the US since the Islamic Revolution. - Iran has been helping Russia in its war with Ukraine. That does have strategic implications to the US. So it's not true that Iran does not matter strategically. Those Shaed drones are flying into Ukraine by the thousands. - Iran has supported the Houthis in Yemen (which effectively can close the Suez Canal traffic when they feel like it) and has levers on Saudi Arabia both directly and indirectly through Yemen. Another strategic lever. - The whole comparison to Iraq's ground war is completely irrelevant. Iran and Iraq are very different countries with very different history and this conflict is very different in many ways. The US is not going to invade and conquer Iran. - If Iran has made so much trouble over the years without ICBMs and nuclear weapons should we just wait for them to acquire these technologies? What do we think about the rationality of this regime vs. the North Korean one? Is North Korea really the right analogy? "Iran was not a major strategic priority" maybe add yet? When it becomes a major strategic priority with ICBMs and nuclear weapons then what? Nobody knows where this war will end. Did the US have to go to war now? Probably not. Was there an opportunity between the internal unrest, the massacre of Iranian civilians, the intelligence and military superiority. Yes. What would the outcome be of not going to war? What's the certainty of that outcome? I don't think a nuclear Iran with ICBMs would be a good thing for the world and they would definitely go there.

jmyeet 6mo ago

The tl;dr here is, with all due respect, that your premises are basically all wrong. > (1) reducing oil shipments to China is good posturing for the US No, it isn't. For several reasons: 1. China has stockpiled ~1.4 billion barrels of oil. it'a net importer. Supplies from Russia aren't disrupted. At present, Iranian oil is still gointg to China; 2. China is rapidly decreasing its dependence on fossil fuels with renewable energy projects on a scale where they're building more solar, for example, than the rest of the world combined. They also produce those panels so there's no supply chain risk there; 3. While the US is a net oil exporter, it's not universal. California, for example, has no pipelines so 75% of its oil comes from the sea. ~20-25% of that comes from Iraq and is disrupted by the Strait being closed; 4. Qatar produces 20-30% of the world's Helium supply and ~20% of the world's LNG, both of which are disrupted; 5. ~30% of the world's fertilizer is disrupted by the Strait being closed. The US is way more impacted by fertilizer disruption than China is. > (2) Iran isn't the only one who can control passage throught the strait. All gulf countries can do so. The other Gulf states are US client states. Why would Saudi Arabia close the Strait, which especially hurts US interests? I also doubt any of them can to the same degree. The entire Iranian military is geared towards this strategy with drone and ballistic missile production on a scale no other country is really built for. It has hardened military infrastructure designed for decades to resist US bombardment. Other Gulf states don't have this hardened infrastructure and are more vulernable to Iranian attack if it came down to it. Take desalination plants as an example. Yes Iran has those too but Iran also has significant snow melt as a source of water, Mountains, remember? Iran has ski resorts they have that much snow. > Russia invading Ukraine and failing Russia has basically succeeded. You have fairly stagnant battle lines where neither side can particularly advance but Russia holds certain Ukrainian territory now for years. Russia is just going to wait for the West to get bored and give up. Russia's economy has proven itself to be surprisingly resilient. Sanctions just don't work on enemies like Iran, Russia or North Korea as well as they do on allies or former allies because enemies have an entire national project to resist American imperialism. They have to be self-reliant in a way that allies just don't. This is also why the US client states in the Gulf are hurting way more from the Strait being closed: their economies aren't built for it. Iran's is. > ... the weakened China (due to oil constraints) would be simply unable to attack in 2028, the strategic window when it can do so. So this is where you've really gone off the deep end. China is less affected by this, in part because of long-term strategy but short-term because Chinese shipments are still going through the Strait. American imperialists (which is both Republicans and Demorats, for the record) have this weird idea that China will invade Taiwan. Or wants to. Or it can. None of those things are true. It really feels like projection, like every accusation is a confession. China must be doing violent imperialism because that's what the US is doing. China can blockade Taiwan but that won't really do anything any more than an aerial bombardment will do anything to Iran. China doesn't have the amphibious capability to land an invasion on Taiwan any more than the US does in Iran. If you think otherwise, I'm sorry but you're gorssly mistaken. But all of that ignores the real issue: China doesn't need to invade (or blockade) Taiwan. Why? Because all but ~10 countries in the world already view Taiwan as part of China. In the US (and Europe) it's called the One China policy. It is US government policy and consistent across both parties. Why would China upset the international order when everybody already agrees with them?