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> decades ago securesm OSes tracked the provenience of every byte (clean/dirty), to detect leaks, but it's hard if you want your agent to be useful Yeah, you'r
by ryanrasti 7mo ago
> decades ago securesm OSes tracked the provenience of every byte (clean/dirty), to detect leaks, but it's hard if you want your agent to be useful
Yeah, you're hitting on the core tradeoff between correctness and usefulness.
The key differences here:
1. We're not tracking at byte-level but at the tool-call/capability level (e.g., read emails) and enforcing at egress (e.g., send emails)
2. Agent can slowly learn approved patterns from user behavior/common exceptions to strict policy. You can be strict at the start and give more autonomy for known-safe flows over time.
- botusaurus 7mo agowhat about the interaction between these 2 flows: - summarize email to text file - send report to email the issue is tracking that the first step didnt contaminate the second step, i dont see how you can solve this in a non-probabilistic works 99% of the time way
- ryanrasti 7mo agoI think what you're saying is agent can write to an intermediate file, then read from it, bypassing the taint-tracking system. The fix is to make all IO tracked by the system -- if you read a file it has taints as part of the read, either from your previous write or configured somehow.