8 ms·

What are you talking about? Which airframe scandal?

by nocoiner 10mo ago

mdorazio 10mo ago
737 MAX. That whole saga was because of Boeing trying really hard to not certify a new airframe so that they could quickly push out a competitor to A320 Neo. The result was hundreds of deaths.
- JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
  737 Max was a compendium of failures. Airframe wasn’t one of them. If anything, the 737 series’ airframes are perfected to a fault.
  - ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
    Tons of problems that only are accepted due being grandfathered in.
    - JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
      > Tons of problems that only are accepted due being grandfathered in What are you basing this on?
      - ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
        For example a modern EICAS system is required today, and all modern passenger aircraft have one. Except the 737 Max. The 737 Max 7 and 10 had to get a waiver due to not being certified in time by the hard requirement to have one when updating old types. Let alone certifying new types.
        JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
        > a modern EICAS system is required today, and all modern passenger aircraft have one. Except the 737 Max Instrumentation. Not airframe. Boeing’s failure was in trying to make a great airframe compensate for failings in other systems.
        ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
        It is a lackluster airframe but with an entire workforce certified to fly it and thus it is forced to stay around. Just look at the anti-ice issues preventing 737 Max 7 and 10 to be certified.
        JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
        > Just look at the anti-ice issues preventing 737 Max 7 and 10 to be certified Not airframe!
        ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
        Ignore everything that makes the 737 a modern passenger aircraft and it’s awesome!
        JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
        > Ignore everything that makes the 737 a modern passenger aircraft and it’s awesome! You’re moving the goalposts because you didn’t understand what an airframe is.
        ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
        The engine anti ice system are literally generic aerodynamic parts and control systems provided by Boeing. You know, part of the same assembly causing MCAS to exist. But that is of course not part of the airframe.
        JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
        > that is of course not part of the airframe Correct. The 737’s airframe’s excellence is the reason Boeing was loath to let it go. It’s a really good airframe, and a market fit to boot for the transition from hub and spoke. A clean-sheet design for the 737 would look a lot like the 737. That is what makes the shortcuts tempting. Engines, avionics and control software are distinct components and not part of the airframe. (Debatable only on engine cowlings and mounts. Neither of which were relevant to the 737 Max’s faults.)
  - miyuru 10mo ago
    Didn't the problems start when Boeing began using new engines on an old airframe for the Max? https://www.eetimes.com/software-wont-fix-boeings-faulty-airframe/ https://www.eetimes.com/software-wont-fix-boeings-faulty-air...
    - JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
      Yes. The problem wasn’t the airframe, nor even frankly the engines, it was the combination plus the decision to fix an aerodynamic instability with an undocumented software patch.
      - _DeadFred_ 10mo ago
        And putting certain related functionality behind a paywall.
      - acdha 10mo ago
        That last part is key: the MCAS system was designed to fake handling like the older planes but they skimped on safety to save the cost of a second sensor and didn’t train pilots on it or have an override mechanism. If the whole thing had been aboveboard they’d have saved so many lives…
        exidy 10mo ago
        There was an override system, MCAS drove the stabiliser trim motors and so flipping the stabiliser trim motor cutout switches would disable MCAS. This relied on the pilots diagnosing an MCAS runaway as a stabiliser trim runaway and enacting the same checklist. However, to add insult to injury, the MAX also had another change. In the 737 NG, there were two switches, one would disable automated movement of stabiliser trim, the other would cutout the electric trim motors entirely. This allowed the pilots to disable automation without losing the ability to trim the aircraft using the switches on the yoke. The MAX changed this arrangement, now either switch would cut power to electric trim. Tragically the pilots of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 recognised the runaway, enacted the correct checklist, but the aircraft was now so far out of trim that aerodynamic loads made correcting the situation using the hand trim crank impossible. In desperation the pilots restored electrical power to the trim motors, MCAS re-engaged and drove the aircraft into the ground.
- 05 10mo ago
  Southwest's 737 MAX contract had a penalty clause of $1 million per aircraft that would trigger if Boeing's delivery contract for the 737 MAX failed to meet certain standards, particularly Southwest's insistence that no flight simulator training be required for the MAX Meaning, the roots of the “no new type rating” requirement come from Southwest, not Boeing.
  - rwmj 10mo ago
    Presumably Boeing weren't under duress when they signed the contract.
    - elteto 10mo ago
      The Boeing execs had their bonuses held against their heads.
  - getpost 10mo ago
    This is an interesting detail I had not heard. Can you link to a backstory on this? Why would such a contract ever be signed (especially for a technological product)?
    - acdha 10mo ago
      There’s a really good podcast episode here: https://engineered.network/causality/episode-33-737-max/ https://engineered.network/causality/episode-33-737-max/ Basically they were looking for an edge against Airbus and a really big one was being able to promise that pilots wouldn’t need a separate certification from the existing 737, which is where that MCAS software came in trying to make the new hardware behave like the existing planes. The allegations about Southwest in particular got the most attention in this lawsuit: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/legal-filing-reveals-southwest-airlines-proposed-a-ploy-to-deceive-faa-on-boeing-737-max/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/legal...
  - raverbashing 10mo ago
    Southwest and all the legacy carriers So, how much they spent with the grounding again?
wood_spirit 10mo ago
Wasn’t there a scandal about doors falling off that came back to missing screws missed in cutback inspections that had been outsourced to a split off subsidiary or something like that?
- toast0 10mo ago
  You've got the whole thing wrong. Only one door plug fell out. Other door plugs were inspected but there was no reporting on their condition. The door plug seems to have fallen out due to lack of nuts, not missing screws. There was rework due to poor work from a spun out former subsidiary that required the door plug to be opened, but I think? the door plug was opened and closed by Boeing, and not properly recorded by Boeing in the work log, resulting in no inspection/verification and nobody else noticed the missing nuts either; IIRC the opening was recorded 'in the wrong place' and the closing wasn't recorded at all. I wouldn't call that a 'cutback inspection' I don't remember which party is responsible for installing the interior trim that covers the door plug, but their checklist must not have included verifying that the door plug nuts and their retaining wire were in place, either.
eastbound 10mo ago
In 2013, they externalized the construction of the metal rings that make the body. It was supposed to be CNC’d, but the provider obviously made them manually, with all the mistakes that entails, including sloppy sawing and cutting holes in the wrong places. It was validated for production, because of political pressure to not blame the provider. Boeing re-cut the holes in the right places, making them twice weaker. So yes, the MAX isn’t the first unsafe plane of Boeing. That it wasn’t proven that it caused accidents, doesn’t mean it was safe. And there are countless other affairs like this. The lithium batteries.

What are you talking about? Which airframe scandal?

737 MAX. That whole saga was because of Boeing trying really hard to not certify a new airframe so that they could quickly push out a competitor to A320 Neo. The result was hundreds of deaths.

JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
737 Max was a compendium of failures. Airframe wasn’t one of them. If anything, the 737 series’ airframes are perfected to a fault.
- ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
  Tons of problems that only are accepted due being grandfathered in.
  - JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
    > Tons of problems that only are accepted due being grandfathered in What are you basing this on?
    - ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
      For example a modern EICAS system is required today, and all modern passenger aircraft have one. Except the 737 Max. The 737 Max 7 and 10 had to get a waiver due to not being certified in time by the hard requirement to have one when updating old types. Let alone certifying new types.
      - JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
        > a modern EICAS system is required today, and all modern passenger aircraft have one. Except the 737 Max Instrumentation. Not airframe. Boeing’s failure was in trying to make a great airframe compensate for failings in other systems.
        ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
        It is a lackluster airframe but with an entire workforce certified to fly it and thus it is forced to stay around. Just look at the anti-ice issues preventing 737 Max 7 and 10 to be certified.
        JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
        > Just look at the anti-ice issues preventing 737 Max 7 and 10 to be certified Not airframe!
        ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
        Ignore everything that makes the 737 a modern passenger aircraft and it’s awesome!
        JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
        > Ignore everything that makes the 737 a modern passenger aircraft and it’s awesome! You’re moving the goalposts because you didn’t understand what an airframe is.
        ViewTrick1002 10mo ago
        The engine anti ice system are literally generic aerodynamic parts and control systems provided by Boeing. You know, part of the same assembly causing MCAS to exist. But that is of course not part of the airframe.
        JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
        > that is of course not part of the airframe Correct. The 737’s airframe’s excellence is the reason Boeing was loath to let it go. It’s a really good airframe, and a market fit to boot for the transition from hub and spoke. A clean-sheet design for the 737 would look a lot like the 737. That is what makes the shortcuts tempting. Engines, avionics and control software are distinct components and not part of the airframe. (Debatable only on engine cowlings and mounts. Neither of which were relevant to the 737 Max’s faults.)
- miyuru 10mo ago
  Didn't the problems start when Boeing began using new engines on an old airframe for the Max? https://www.eetimes.com/software-wont-fix-boeings-faulty-airframe/ https://www.eetimes.com/software-wont-fix-boeings-faulty-air...
  - JumpCrisscross 10mo ago
    Yes. The problem wasn’t the airframe, nor even frankly the engines, it was the combination plus the decision to fix an aerodynamic instability with an undocumented software patch.
    - _DeadFred_ 10mo ago
      And putting certain related functionality behind a paywall.
    - acdha 10mo ago
      That last part is key: the MCAS system was designed to fake handling like the older planes but they skimped on safety to save the cost of a second sensor and didn’t train pilots on it or have an override mechanism. If the whole thing had been aboveboard they’d have saved so many lives…
      - exidy 10mo ago
        There was an override system, MCAS drove the stabiliser trim motors and so flipping the stabiliser trim motor cutout switches would disable MCAS. This relied on the pilots diagnosing an MCAS runaway as a stabiliser trim runaway and enacting the same checklist. However, to add insult to injury, the MAX also had another change. In the 737 NG, there were two switches, one would disable automated movement of stabiliser trim, the other would cutout the electric trim motors entirely. This allowed the pilots to disable automation without losing the ability to trim the aircraft using the switches on the yoke. The MAX changed this arrangement, now either switch would cut power to electric trim. Tragically the pilots of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 recognised the runaway, enacted the correct checklist, but the aircraft was now so far out of trim that aerodynamic loads made correcting the situation using the hand trim crank impossible. In desperation the pilots restored electrical power to the trim motors, MCAS re-engaged and drove the aircraft into the ground.
05 10mo ago
Southwest's 737 MAX contract had a penalty clause of $1 million per aircraft that would trigger if Boeing's delivery contract for the 737 MAX failed to meet certain standards, particularly Southwest's insistence that no flight simulator training be required for the MAX Meaning, the roots of the “no new type rating” requirement come from Southwest, not Boeing.
- rwmj 10mo ago
  Presumably Boeing weren't under duress when they signed the contract.
  - elteto 10mo ago
    The Boeing execs had their bonuses held against their heads.
- getpost 10mo ago
  This is an interesting detail I had not heard. Can you link to a backstory on this? Why would such a contract ever be signed (especially for a technological product)?
  - acdha 10mo ago
    There’s a really good podcast episode here: https://engineered.network/causality/episode-33-737-max/ https://engineered.network/causality/episode-33-737-max/ Basically they were looking for an edge against Airbus and a really big one was being able to promise that pilots wouldn’t need a separate certification from the existing 737, which is where that MCAS software came in trying to make the new hardware behave like the existing planes. The allegations about Southwest in particular got the most attention in this lawsuit: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/legal-filing-reveals-southwest-airlines-proposed-a-ploy-to-deceive-faa-on-boeing-737-max/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/legal...
- raverbashing 10mo ago
  Southwest and all the legacy carriers So, how much they spent with the grounding again?

wood_spirit 10mo ago

Wasn’t there a scandal about doors falling off that came back to missing screws missed in cutback inspections that had been outsourced to a split off subsidiary or something like that?

toast0 10mo ago
You've got the whole thing wrong. Only one door plug fell out. Other door plugs were inspected but there was no reporting on their condition. The door plug seems to have fallen out due to lack of nuts, not missing screws. There was rework due to poor work from a spun out former subsidiary that required the door plug to be opened, but I think? the door plug was opened and closed by Boeing, and not properly recorded by Boeing in the work log, resulting in no inspection/verification and nobody else noticed the missing nuts either; IIRC the opening was recorded 'in the wrong place' and the closing wasn't recorded at all. I wouldn't call that a 'cutback inspection' I don't remember which party is responsible for installing the interior trim that covers the door plug, but their checklist must not have included verifying that the door plug nuts and their retaining wire were in place, either.

eastbound 10mo ago

In 2013, they externalized the construction of the metal rings that make the body. It was supposed to be CNC’d, but the provider obviously made them manually, with all the mistakes that entails, including sloppy sawing and cutting holes in the wrong places. It was validated for production, because of political pressure to not blame the provider. Boeing re-cut the holes in the right places, making them twice weaker. So yes, the MAX isn’t the first unsafe plane of Boeing. That it wasn’t proven that it caused accidents, doesn’t mean it was safe. And there are countless other affairs like this. The lithium batteries.