Not without approval, see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Clipboard_API#security_considerations https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/AP

Not without approval, see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Clipboard_API#security_considerations https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Clipboard_A... or https://web.dev/articles/async-clipboard#security_and_permissions https://web.dev/articles/async-clipboard#security_and_permis.... But that is not relevant here. Instead of the .torrent files, the compromised website served a .zip file, which contained a .exe. When opened, it shows a GUI to select a Xubuntu version and a button to generate the link. When that button was clicked, the malware showed a download link to the user and, in the background, deployed a second stage to %APPDATA%\osn10963\elzvcf.exe and executed it. The second stage monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency addresses which it will replace with attacker-controlled ones. The second stage is also added to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ to ensure it is run whenever the user logs in. Both stages have some limited anti-debugging and anti-VM functionality.