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How do you propose it's implemented though? The two sides in this debate seem to be talking at cross purposes, which is why it goes round and round. A: "We ne

How do you propose it's implemented though? The two sides in this debate seem to be talking at cross purposes, which is why it goes round and round. A: "We need to do this, however it's done, it was possible before so it must be possible now" B: "You can't do this because of the implementation details (i.e. you can't break encryption without breaking it for everyone)" ad infinitum. Regardless of my own views on this, it seems to me that A needs to make a concrete proposal

ZeroConcerns 1y ago
Lawful intercept laws exist, and they've been sort-of functional for ages. Apps like Signal don't entirely fall within the scope of these, which is the cause of the current manic attempts to grab more powers. My point is that these powers grabs should be resisted, and that new services should be brought into the fold of existing laws. The prevailing opinion here seems to be that, instead, state hacking should be endorsed. Which, well...
- qwopmaster 1y ago
  The prevailing opinion here seems to be that we’d really like for there to not be an omnipresent panopticon because protect the children or terrorists or, apparently, malware. If your imagination is particularly lacking on how this might be weaponized just remember that antifa is now designated as an terrorist organization in US, so you better not be a suspected member of it — as in, you best not have sent a buddy a message on signal about how those tiki torch carrying nazi larpers aren’t exactly great guys, or off to a black site you go for supporting terrorism. If you want to prosecute people send physical goons, which are of limited quantity, rather than limitless, cheaper and better by the day pervasive surveillance of everybody and everything.
  - ZeroConcerns 1y ago
    > an omnipresent panopticon OK, sorry to keep repeating myself here, but... I strongly oppose any kind of "panopticon" like ChatControl. What I would like to see, is, say, Signal complying with lawful interception orders in the same way that any EU telecoms provider currently does. So, provide cleartext contents of communications to/from a cleary identified party, for a limited time, by judicial order, for a clearly specified reason. > pervasive surveillance of everybody and everything This is exactly what lawful intercept laws are supposed to prevent. And yeah, of course, abuse, but under a functioning rule of law there are at least ways to remedy that, unlike with mass surveillance and/or malware...
    - NobodyNada 1y ago
      > I strongly oppose any kind of "panopticon" like ChatControl. What I would like to see, is, say, Signal [...] provide cleartext contents of communications to/from a cleary identified party Those statements simply aren't compatible. Right now, Signal is designed by cryptography experts to provide the best privacy we know how to build: messages are only readable by you or the intended recipient. "Lawful intercept" necessarily means some additional third party is given the ability to read messages. It doesn't matter what kind of legal framework you have around that, because you can't just build a cryptosystem where the key is "a warrant issued under due process." There has to be a system, somewhere, that has access to plaintext messages and can give law enforcement and courts access. The judges, officers, technicians, suppliers, and software involved in building and using this system are all potential vectors by which this access can be compromised or misused -- whether via software or hardware attacks, social engineering, or abuse of power. Maybe your country has "functioning rule of law", and every single government official and all the vendors they hire are pure as snow, but what about all the rest of us living in imperfect countries? What about when a less-than-totally-law-abiding regime comes into power? You're proposing that we secure our private conversations with TSA luggage locks.
      - Zak 1y ago
        For a real-world example of the problem you're describing, China's Salt Typhoon attacks compromised lawful intercept infrastructure in the USA to engage in espionage. A mandatory backdoor in Signal would be at risk from similar attacks. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_Typhoon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_Typhoon
      - ZeroConcerns 1y ago
        > You're proposing that we secure our private conversations with TSA luggage locks No -- that's an incredibly reductive summary, and the attitude you display here is, if left unchecked, exactly what will allow something equally ridiculous like ChatControl to pass eventually. There has been plenty of previous debate when innovations like postal mail, telegraph traffic and phone calls were introduced. This debate has resulted in laws, jurisprudence, and corresponding operating procedures for law enforcement. You may believe there are no legitimate reasons to intercept private communications, but the actual laws of the country you live in right now say otherwise, I guarantee you. You may not like that, and/or not believe in the rule of law anymore anyway, but I can't help you with that. What I can hopefully convince you of, is that there needs to be some way to bring modern technology in line with existing laws, while avoiding "9/11"-style breakdowns of civil rights.

ZeroConcerns 1y ago

Lawful intercept laws exist, and they've been sort-of functional for ages. Apps like Signal don't entirely fall within the scope of these, which is the cause of the current manic attempts to grab more powers. My point is that these powers grabs should be resisted, and that new services should be brought into the fold of existing laws. The prevailing opinion here seems to be that, instead, state hacking should be endorsed. Which, well...

qwopmaster 1y ago
The prevailing opinion here seems to be that we’d really like for there to not be an omnipresent panopticon because protect the children or terrorists or, apparently, malware. If your imagination is particularly lacking on how this might be weaponized just remember that antifa is now designated as an terrorist organization in US, so you better not be a suspected member of it — as in, you best not have sent a buddy a message on signal about how those tiki torch carrying nazi larpers aren’t exactly great guys, or off to a black site you go for supporting terrorism. If you want to prosecute people send physical goons, which are of limited quantity, rather than limitless, cheaper and better by the day pervasive surveillance of everybody and everything.
- ZeroConcerns 1y ago
  > an omnipresent panopticon OK, sorry to keep repeating myself here, but... I strongly oppose any kind of "panopticon" like ChatControl. What I would like to see, is, say, Signal complying with lawful interception orders in the same way that any EU telecoms provider currently does. So, provide cleartext contents of communications to/from a cleary identified party, for a limited time, by judicial order, for a clearly specified reason. > pervasive surveillance of everybody and everything This is exactly what lawful intercept laws are supposed to prevent. And yeah, of course, abuse, but under a functioning rule of law there are at least ways to remedy that, unlike with mass surveillance and/or malware...
  - NobodyNada 1y ago
    > I strongly oppose any kind of "panopticon" like ChatControl. What I would like to see, is, say, Signal [...] provide cleartext contents of communications to/from a cleary identified party Those statements simply aren't compatible. Right now, Signal is designed by cryptography experts to provide the best privacy we know how to build: messages are only readable by you or the intended recipient. "Lawful intercept" necessarily means some additional third party is given the ability to read messages. It doesn't matter what kind of legal framework you have around that, because you can't just build a cryptosystem where the key is "a warrant issued under due process." There has to be a system, somewhere, that has access to plaintext messages and can give law enforcement and courts access. The judges, officers, technicians, suppliers, and software involved in building and using this system are all potential vectors by which this access can be compromised or misused -- whether via software or hardware attacks, social engineering, or abuse of power. Maybe your country has "functioning rule of law", and every single government official and all the vendors they hire are pure as snow, but what about all the rest of us living in imperfect countries? What about when a less-than-totally-law-abiding regime comes into power? You're proposing that we secure our private conversations with TSA luggage locks.
    - Zak 1y ago
      For a real-world example of the problem you're describing, China's Salt Typhoon attacks compromised lawful intercept infrastructure in the USA to engage in espionage. A mandatory backdoor in Signal would be at risk from similar attacks. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_Typhoon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_Typhoon
    - ZeroConcerns 1y ago
      > You're proposing that we secure our private conversations with TSA luggage locks No -- that's an incredibly reductive summary, and the attitude you display here is, if left unchecked, exactly what will allow something equally ridiculous like ChatControl to pass eventually. There has been plenty of previous debate when innovations like postal mail, telegraph traffic and phone calls were introduced. This debate has resulted in laws, jurisprudence, and corresponding operating procedures for law enforcement. You may believe there are no legitimate reasons to intercept private communications, but the actual laws of the country you live in right now say otherwise, I guarantee you. You may not like that, and/or not believe in the rule of law anymore anyway, but I can't help you with that. What I can hopefully convince you of, is that there needs to be some way to bring modern technology in line with existing laws, while avoiding "9/11"-style breakdowns of civil rights.