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I'm never using this editor unless it can install itself and work completely offline, without going for downloads and making web requests , it is crucial, espec
by secondary_op 2y ago
I'm never using this editor unless it can install itself and work completely offline, without going for downloads and making web requests , it is crucial, especially after totally not related xz fiasco and the white house praise for rust.
- llmblockchain 2y agoI only use editors written in C, as God intended.
- daghamm 2y agoCorrection: written in C plus some LISP, as God intended.
- thrwymsss 2y ago[flagged]
- tarruda 2y agoThis might seem funny until you read Ken Thompson's "trusting trust" paper and realize that bootstrapping Rust is a so overwhelming task that someone implemented a Rust compiler in C++ for this purpose: https://github.com/dtolnay/bootstrap https://github.com/dtolnay/bootstrap I mean, who knows what kind of malware is transparently being injected in all Rust programs out there.
- School-Cotton 2y agoNobody wrote a C++ compiler for this purpose; they wrote a Rust compiler (mrustc) in C++. > I mean, who knows what kind of malware is transparently being injected in all Rust programs out there. FWIW, using Guix it is very straightforward to build the rust toolchain fully bootstrapped starting from mrustc and gcc.
- tarruda 2y ago> Nobody wrote a C++ compiler for this purpose; they wrote a Rust compiler (mrustc) in C++. Edited the comment
- Gormo 2y agoIf you want a fast, low-memory-footprint editor with no spurious network connectivity and a conventional desktop UI, check out Geany: https://geany.org/ https://geany.org/
- colinsane 2y ago`unshare --user --net zed ~/file-to-edit.txt` seems to work fine. it just shows an "auto update failed" warning in the bottom, but seems otherwise functional. does that work for you?
- arthur-st 2y ago> especially after ... the white house praise for rust What's the threat model here, that Rust is a trojan language from the feds?
- tarruda 2y agoI recommend reading this paper, as it gives some understanding of the things that are possible with an infected toolchain: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrustingTrust.pdf https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_Ref... Some modern compiled languages such as Zig and Go can be officially bootstrapped from a C toolchain. And a C toolchain can be bootstrapped with Guix using only a 357-byte blob. This gives some good confidence that you can bootstrap a malware free toolchain using auditable source artifacts. Rust however, does not have an official way to be bootstrapped from a C compiler, which means developers must use a previous version of the compiler to build a new version. In this situation, you can never be sure a malware was not injected in a previous version of the compiler (see the Ken Thompson paper for an example). There's no way to know because you are using a unauditable blob to create another blob. This is why someone created mrustc, a Rust compiler implemented in pure C++, so that Rust can be bootstrapped from a C toolchain (see also: https://users.rust-lang.org/t/understanding-how-the-rust-compiler-is-built/87237/7 https://users.rust-lang.org/t/understanding-how-the-rust-com...). The mrustc solution is not good because there are essentially 2 implementations of the same compiler that have to be kept in sync. It would be much better if Rust used a solution like Zig's: https://ziglang.org/news/goodbye-cpp/ https://ziglang.org/news/goodbye-cpp/
- arthur-st 2y agoThis was interesting, cheers!