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As a thought experiment, imagine we were to scan the position of every molecule in the human body to the Heisenberg limit of accuracy. Imagine we were to plug t

As a thought experiment, imagine we were to scan the position of every molecule in the human body to the Heisenberg limit of accuracy. Imagine we were to plug the resulting model in a physics simulation that models every biochemical and physical interaction with perfect fidelity. This is a thought experiment, and what I suggest isn't ruled out by physics, so let's assume it's technologically possible. Would the simulated being be "conscious" in the same way the original human is? Would it experience "qualia"? If you think the answer might be no, then congratulations, you actually believe in immaterial souls, no matter how materialist or rationalist you otherwise claim to be.

mistermann 2y ago
Not necessarily, one could be a Pedant.
vundercind 2y ago
Only holds if whatever hardware that’s pretending to be the matter can act exactly like the matter without being the same thing. For the distinction, consider the difference between a simulation of a simple chemical process in a computer—even a perfectly accurate one!—and the actual thing happening. Is the thing going on in the computer the same? No, no matter how perfect the simulation. It’s a little electricity moving around, looking nothing whatsoever like the real thing. The simulation is meaning that we impose on that electricity moving around. That being the case, this reduces to “if we recreate the matter and state exactly, for-real, is that consciousness?” in which case yeah, sure, probably so. This doesn’t work if the thing running the simulation requires interpretation.
- s1artibartfast 2y ago
  exactly, The parent post does not address the issue of representation vs reality. You can simulate every molecular interaction in a fire, but that does not mean the simulation gives off the same heat. You can write a perfectly accurate equation for splitting an atom, but the equation does not release energy.
  - codeflo 2y ago
    > You can simulate every molecular interaction in a fire, but that does not mean the simulation gives off the same heat It would to a simulated being standing next to the fire. > You can write a perfectly accurate equation for splitting an atom, but the equation does not release energy. It releases simulated energy inside the simulation. Every material interaction is simulated. If you believe that consciousness can't exist in the simulation, then you believe that consciousness is not a material interaction, q.e.d.
    - vundercind 2y ago
      It’s some electrons moving around. Any further meaning of that is only what we assign to it. Unless your “computer” is identical matter in the same arrangement and state is the original, actually doing stuff. This is why the “what if you slowly simulated the entire universe on an infinite beach moving rocks around to represent the state? Could anything in it be conscious?” thing isn’t my very interesting. No, you’re just shoving rocks around on sand. They don’t mean anything except what you decide they do. Easy answer.
      - MrScruff 2y ago
        Doesn't materialism imply that a perfectly accurate simulation of the universe would be identical to the universe we live in? If not, in what possible way could the two be distinguished?
    - s1artibartfast 2y ago
      >Every material interaction is simulated. If you believe that consciousness can't exist in the simulation, then you believe that consciousness is not a material interaction I think that is missing the point. You are literally changing the material and medium by conducting a simulation. Releasing simulated energy within a simulation is not identical to releasing real energy in the real world. The former is purely representational, and even a perfectly simulated object retains this property, and lack of equivalence. a simulated atom is not a real atom, no mater their similarlity.
  - 2y ago
- amelius 2y ago
  Ok, next experiment. Imagine you took a brain and replaced one neuron by a transistor (or gate) that performs the exact same function as the neuron. Now replace more and more neurons until all neurons are now transistors. Would the resulting being be conscious and experience qualia, like the original did? If not, at what point was there a notable change? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
  - vundercind 2y ago
    The same function, down to quantum and gravity et c effects on everything around it, and accepting and reacting to same? Yeah probably, but we’re back to having to “run” this on the same arrangement of actual matter as the original. [edit] there’s an obvious attack on this, but I’ll go ahead and note my position on it: the whole premise that we can do any of this without just using actual matter the ordinary way is so far into magical territory that we might as well ask “what if lephuchans simulated it?” or “what if god imagined the simulation?”—well ok, sure, I guess if magic is involved that could work, but what’s the point of even considering it? “What if a miracle occurred?” isn’t a rebuttal to the position that consciousness as we know it likely can’t be simulated by simulating physics, because you can rebut anything with it. Its admission to a discussion is the same as giving up on figuring out anything.
    - mistermann 2y ago
      > there’s an obvious attack on this, but I’ll go ahead and note my position on it: the whole premise that we can do any of this without just using actual matter the ordinary way is so far into magical territory that we might as well ask “what if lephuchans simulated it?” or “what if god imagined the simulation?”—well ok, sure, I guess if magic is involved that could work, but what’s the point of even considering it? That's one of the main points of using a thought experiment: by declaring axioms explicitly, by fiat ("true" by definition), it prevents the mind from taking advantage of thought terminating get out of jail free cards like this, it forces people to argue their point.
  - strogonoff 2y ago
- swid 2y ago
  Are you questioning if physics is computable? Even if it is not fully, we must be able to approximate it quite well. Suppose we scan more than just the person, but a local environment around them and simulated the whole box. The update that occurs as the person sits in the room involves them considering their own existence. Maybe they create art about it. If the simulation is to produce accurate results, they will need to feel alive to themselves. We agree we can simulate an explosion and get accurate results; if we can’t get an accurate simulation of a person, why?
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  >It’s a little electricity moving around, looking nothing whatsoever like the real thing. Why does "looking ... like the real thing" have any relevance for consciousness? What property of a conscious substance is captured by this "looking like" criteria? Is consciousness (partially) a feature of the substrate itself or how the substrate moves through some background consciousness aether, or something else? If you can't articulate what this special criteria is, then why think a simulation isn't conscious, which by assumption reproduces all information dynamics of the physical phenomena?
BobbyJo 2y ago
> If you think the answer might be no, then congratulations, you actually believe in immaterial souls If you scan a body of water, and simulate it perfectly, the resulting simulation will not be wet. You can't separate a material process from the material completely. Consciousness may be a result of carbon being a substrate in the interactions. It might be because the brain is wet when those processes happen. There is plenty of room between believing a perfect computational simulation is not conscious and believing in immaterial souls.
- codeflo 2y ago
  > If you scan a body of water, and simulate it perfectly, the resulting simulation will not be wet. It will be wet to the simulated being that's swimming in it. > Consciousness may be a result of carbon being a substrate in the interactions. Are you conscious? If so, how did you find out that you're made from actual carbon atoms and not simulated ones?
  - BobbyJo 2y ago
    > It will be wet to the simulated being that's swimming in it. Which has an entirely different qualia to us, the beings who consciousness we are trying to unravel. > Are you conscious? That's the big question. > If so, how did you find out that you're made from actual carbon atoms and not simulated ones? If I assume I'm conscious, whatever my atoms are, they are the atoms of concern with regard to said consciousness.
amelius 2y ago
What if you forked the simulator? Would there be two consciousnesses experiencing qualia?
igleria 2y ago
I feel like I've seen this exact post this week on the same topic on this website. Am I going mental, or is hackernews merging duplicate posts?
strogonoff 2y ago
The “total scan” argument, when presented to further a physicalist stance (“surely if we were to scan you using some fantasy tech X we would get an exact copy of you, including any consciousness if it exists, and to deny that is to believe in ghosts”), is unconvincing on at least two counts: 1) fantasy tech illustrating axiomatic belief in particular physical models that are in vogue today but will not hold in the long run (Heisenberg limit? who is she?); and 2) believing that the only alternative to monistic materialism is body-soul dualism, which is depressingly common among STEM folk philosophical naïveté. The most obvious objection is that perceived time-space is a map of some fundamentally inaccessible to us territory, that modern physical models on which the argument depends are likely only covering (imperfectly) a minuscule part of that territory, and that the map may never be fully precise and complete regardless of technology (since a map that is fully precise and complete is the territory).
QuadmasterXLII 2y ago
Instead of one person, simulate the earth starting several million years before the dawn of man. If you think the humans that evolve in some simulation runs are not conscious, you believe in souls. If in the fake world you predict that in some large fraction of simulations of the unfeeling simulacra will nonetheless invent and argue about the concept of qualia, you believe in immaterial souls. If you suspect that because they don’t have souls they won’t write books about qualia you believe in material souls, souls that both affect and are affected by protons and electrons, souls that physics will eventually find.
basil-rash 2y ago
Scott Aaronson’s take on this is certainly worth a read for anyone interested in consciousness , quantum mechanics, comparability theory, etc: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159 https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159
root_axis 2y ago
> This is a thought experiment, and what I suggest isn't ruled out by physics It is actually ruled out by the uncertainty principle. A simulation with perfect fidelity is not a simulation, it's the thing itself.
- anon291 2y ago
  You're actually basically correct, but it's the no-clone theorem, not the uncertainty principle.
birktj 2y ago
Not necessarily, this assumes that it is possible to perfectly simulate physics on computers. It is not obvious that this is true. For one it assumes that physical interactions happen in discrete time steps (or at least be equivalent with a process that happens in discrete time steps). It also assumes that it is possible to perfectly scan the all the properties of some piece of matter (which we know is not possible)
- deleted 2y ago
  [deleted]
filipezf 2y ago
As a sibling comment put, the Scott Aaronson post has lots of interesting questions about this. Do the aliens who are watching us being simulated inside matrix think we are actually conscious? What if they freeze the program for 100 years, or run the computation encrypted, or if the 'computer' is just a human inside a room shuffling papers? Is the computer simulation of a water drop wet ? I found this article [0] very insightful, where they basically propose that consciousness is relative to whom you ask. We inside the simulation may attribute consciousness to each other. The aliens running it may not. What is relevant is the degree of isomorphism between our simulated brain processes and their real ones. So things will advance from all these back-and-forth nebulous arguments only when neuroscience becomes able to explain mechanistically why people claim to be conscious. [0] A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.704270/full https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10....
grishka 2y ago
The answer might be no because it's neither proven nor disproven that the universe as we all perceive it is the fundamental layer of reality.
deleted 2y ago
[deleted]

mistermann 2y ago

Not necessarily, one could be a Pedant.

vundercind 2y ago

Only holds if whatever hardware that’s pretending to be the matter can act exactly like the matter without being the same thing. For the distinction, consider the difference between a simulation of a simple chemical process in a computer—even a perfectly accurate one!—and the actual thing happening. Is the thing going on in the computer the same? No, no matter how perfect the simulation. It’s a little electricity moving around, looking nothing whatsoever like the real thing. The simulation is meaning that we impose on that electricity moving around. That being the case, this reduces to “if we recreate the matter and state exactly, for-real, is that consciousness?” in which case yeah, sure, probably so. This doesn’t work if the thing running the simulation requires interpretation.

s1artibartfast 2y ago
exactly, The parent post does not address the issue of representation vs reality. You can simulate every molecular interaction in a fire, but that does not mean the simulation gives off the same heat. You can write a perfectly accurate equation for splitting an atom, but the equation does not release energy.
- codeflo 2y ago
  > You can simulate every molecular interaction in a fire, but that does not mean the simulation gives off the same heat It would to a simulated being standing next to the fire. > You can write a perfectly accurate equation for splitting an atom, but the equation does not release energy. It releases simulated energy inside the simulation. Every material interaction is simulated. If you believe that consciousness can't exist in the simulation, then you believe that consciousness is not a material interaction, q.e.d.
  - vundercind 2y ago
    It’s some electrons moving around. Any further meaning of that is only what we assign to it. Unless your “computer” is identical matter in the same arrangement and state is the original, actually doing stuff. This is why the “what if you slowly simulated the entire universe on an infinite beach moving rocks around to represent the state? Could anything in it be conscious?” thing isn’t my very interesting. No, you’re just shoving rocks around on sand. They don’t mean anything except what you decide they do. Easy answer.
    - MrScruff 2y ago
      Doesn't materialism imply that a perfectly accurate simulation of the universe would be identical to the universe we live in? If not, in what possible way could the two be distinguished?
  - s1artibartfast 2y ago
    >Every material interaction is simulated. If you believe that consciousness can't exist in the simulation, then you believe that consciousness is not a material interaction I think that is missing the point. You are literally changing the material and medium by conducting a simulation. Releasing simulated energy within a simulation is not identical to releasing real energy in the real world. The former is purely representational, and even a perfectly simulated object retains this property, and lack of equivalence. a simulated atom is not a real atom, no mater their similarlity.
- 2y ago
amelius 2y ago
Ok, next experiment. Imagine you took a brain and replaced one neuron by a transistor (or gate) that performs the exact same function as the neuron. Now replace more and more neurons until all neurons are now transistors. Would the resulting being be conscious and experience qualia, like the original did? If not, at what point was there a notable change? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
- vundercind 2y ago
  The same function, down to quantum and gravity et c effects on everything around it, and accepting and reacting to same? Yeah probably, but we’re back to having to “run” this on the same arrangement of actual matter as the original. [edit] there’s an obvious attack on this, but I’ll go ahead and note my position on it: the whole premise that we can do any of this without just using actual matter the ordinary way is so far into magical territory that we might as well ask “what if lephuchans simulated it?” or “what if god imagined the simulation?”—well ok, sure, I guess if magic is involved that could work, but what’s the point of even considering it? “What if a miracle occurred?” isn’t a rebuttal to the position that consciousness as we know it likely can’t be simulated by simulating physics, because you can rebut anything with it. Its admission to a discussion is the same as giving up on figuring out anything.
  - mistermann 2y ago
    > there’s an obvious attack on this, but I’ll go ahead and note my position on it: the whole premise that we can do any of this without just using actual matter the ordinary way is so far into magical territory that we might as well ask “what if lephuchans simulated it?” or “what if god imagined the simulation?”—well ok, sure, I guess if magic is involved that could work, but what’s the point of even considering it? That's one of the main points of using a thought experiment: by declaring axioms explicitly, by fiat ("true" by definition), it prevents the mind from taking advantage of thought terminating get out of jail free cards like this, it forces people to argue their point.
- strogonoff 2y ago
swid 2y ago
Are you questioning if physics is computable? Even if it is not fully, we must be able to approximate it quite well. Suppose we scan more than just the person, but a local environment around them and simulated the whole box. The update that occurs as the person sits in the room involves them considering their own existence. Maybe they create art about it. If the simulation is to produce accurate results, they will need to feel alive to themselves. We agree we can simulate an explosion and get accurate results; if we can’t get an accurate simulation of a person, why?
hackinthebochs 2y ago
>It’s a little electricity moving around, looking nothing whatsoever like the real thing. Why does "looking ... like the real thing" have any relevance for consciousness? What property of a conscious substance is captured by this "looking like" criteria? Is consciousness (partially) a feature of the substrate itself or how the substrate moves through some background consciousness aether, or something else? If you can't articulate what this special criteria is, then why think a simulation isn't conscious, which by assumption reproduces all information dynamics of the physical phenomena?

BobbyJo 2y ago

> If you think the answer might be no, then congratulations, you actually believe in immaterial souls If you scan a body of water, and simulate it perfectly, the resulting simulation will not be wet. You can't separate a material process from the material completely. Consciousness may be a result of carbon being a substrate in the interactions. It might be because the brain is wet when those processes happen. There is plenty of room between believing a perfect computational simulation is not conscious and believing in immaterial souls.

codeflo 2y ago
> If you scan a body of water, and simulate it perfectly, the resulting simulation will not be wet. It will be wet to the simulated being that's swimming in it. > Consciousness may be a result of carbon being a substrate in the interactions. Are you conscious? If so, how did you find out that you're made from actual carbon atoms and not simulated ones?
- BobbyJo 2y ago
  > It will be wet to the simulated being that's swimming in it. Which has an entirely different qualia to us, the beings who consciousness we are trying to unravel. > Are you conscious? That's the big question. > If so, how did you find out that you're made from actual carbon atoms and not simulated ones? If I assume I'm conscious, whatever my atoms are, they are the atoms of concern with regard to said consciousness.

amelius 2y ago

What if you forked the simulator? Would there be two consciousnesses experiencing qualia?

igleria 2y ago

I feel like I've seen this exact post this week on the same topic on this website. Am I going mental, or is hackernews merging duplicate posts?

strogonoff 2y ago

The “total scan” argument, when presented to further a physicalist stance (“surely if we were to scan you using some fantasy tech X we would get an exact copy of you, including any consciousness if it exists, and to deny that is to believe in ghosts”), is unconvincing on at least two counts: 1) fantasy tech illustrating axiomatic belief in particular physical models that are in vogue today but will not hold in the long run (Heisenberg limit? who is she?); and 2) believing that the only alternative to monistic materialism is body-soul dualism, which is depressingly common among STEM folk philosophical naïveté. The most obvious objection is that perceived time-space is a map of some fundamentally inaccessible to us territory, that modern physical models on which the argument depends are likely only covering (imperfectly) a minuscule part of that territory, and that the map may never be fully precise and complete regardless of technology (since a map that is fully precise and complete is the territory).

QuadmasterXLII 2y ago

Instead of one person, simulate the earth starting several million years before the dawn of man. If you think the humans that evolve in some simulation runs are not conscious, you believe in souls. If in the fake world you predict that in some large fraction of simulations of the unfeeling simulacra will nonetheless invent and argue about the concept of qualia, you believe in immaterial souls. If you suspect that because they don’t have souls they won’t write books about qualia you believe in material souls, souls that both affect and are affected by protons and electrons, souls that physics will eventually find.

basil-rash 2y ago

Scott Aaronson’s take on this is certainly worth a read for anyone interested in consciousness , quantum mechanics, comparability theory, etc: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159 https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159

root_axis 2y ago

> This is a thought experiment, and what I suggest isn't ruled out by physics It is actually ruled out by the uncertainty principle. A simulation with perfect fidelity is not a simulation, it's the thing itself.

anon291 2y ago
You're actually basically correct, but it's the no-clone theorem, not the uncertainty principle.

birktj 2y ago

Not necessarily, this assumes that it is possible to perfectly simulate physics on computers. It is not obvious that this is true. For one it assumes that physical interactions happen in discrete time steps (or at least be equivalent with a process that happens in discrete time steps). It also assumes that it is possible to perfectly scan the all the properties of some piece of matter (which we know is not possible)

deleted 2y ago
[deleted]

filipezf 2y ago

As a sibling comment put, the Scott Aaronson post has lots of interesting questions about this. Do the aliens who are watching us being simulated inside matrix think we are actually conscious? What if they freeze the program for 100 years, or run the computation encrypted, or if the 'computer' is just a human inside a room shuffling papers? Is the computer simulation of a water drop wet ? I found this article [0] very insightful, where they basically propose that consciousness is relative to whom you ask. We inside the simulation may attribute consciousness to each other. The aliens running it may not. What is relevant is the degree of isomorphism between our simulated brain processes and their real ones. So things will advance from all these back-and-forth nebulous arguments only when neuroscience becomes able to explain mechanistically why people claim to be conscious. [0] A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.704270/full https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10....

grishka 2y ago

The answer might be no because it's neither proven nor disproven that the universe as we all perceive it is the fundamental layer of reality.

deleted 2y ago

[deleted]