6 ms·

The fact that a critical piece of the evidence was cell phone photos sent between workers coordinating door re-assembly doesn't exactly instill a whole lot of c

The fact that a critical piece of the evidence was cell phone photos sent between workers coordinating door re-assembly doesn't exactly instill a whole lot of confidence in their permit-to-work process. I didn't like it when it was medical teams doing shift handover via a Google Doc, and I don't like it when it's a matter of flight safety either. Or, as Homer might eruditely say: "guess I forgot to put the bolts back in" [1] [1] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IiNPLIauEig https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IiNPLIauEig)

gowings97 3y ago
The data/photos should be in the ERP/MES.
ipython 3y ago
This is a puzzling attitude to me. Every time we technologists see a crappy proprietary solution being used for a problem, the first exclamation is, "why not use <commodity solution X>? That's so dumb, they spent $10k on that tool when they could have spent $100 on X!" There must be a middle ground here- the paradox is that Google, Apple, etc have this ability to generate user friendly software and hardware at scale. But they aren't considered "battle proven". The expensive proprietary systems that are used instead tend to be hard to use and brittle, so what's the middle ground?
- deleted 3y ago
  [deleted]
- michael1999 3y ago
  The issue here isn't using google chat, the accusation is that this was Spirit and Boeing conspiring to not record these in the proper work order system under the pretence that this work was being done by Spirit as-if-it-were pre-delivery. Read https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/146074-boeing-internal-whistleblower-re-max-door.html https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/146074-boeing-inte... And then this from the doc: "The investigation continues to determine what manufacturing documents were used to authorize the opening and closing of the left MED plug during the rivet rework." https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24410269/report_dca24ma063_193617_2_6_2024-2_15_12-pm.pdf https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24410269/report_dca24...
  - ethbr1 3y ago
    A key point I read somewhere in the accusations is that non-Boeing contractors (e.g. Spirit) by policy cannot have access to CMES. Consequently, you have a system of record that a major party to work doesn't have access to. As we've all seen, this leads to "actual coordination" being instead done in a system all involved parties do have access to (SAT). Which inevitably leads to a desync between CMES (SOR by fiat) and SAT (SOR in practice).
    - calebpeterson 3y ago
      SOR - system of record SAT - ? CMES - ?
      - ethbr1 3y ago
        They're described in parent's first link. Boeing systems.
    - deleted 3y ago
      [deleted]
    - michael1999 3y ago
      But isn't that exactly the underlying fraud? Boeing and Spirit are conspiring to cover up Spirit's deficient delivery by allowing Spirit to work onsite at Renton and do post-delivery re-work and pretend that it is as-if delivered, and _outside_ Boeing's system of record. To reject the delivery and wait for Spirit to fix would ruin their delivery schedule, so they fudge it and muddle along. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-puts-more-boots-on-the-floor-at-renton-plant-as-boeing-slows-work/#:~:text=For%20years%2C%20Spirit%20AeroSystems%20has,Renton%20to%20do%20catchup%20work.&text=During%20the%20Quality%20Stand%20Down,ripple%20through%20the%20production%20line https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-p....
    - deleted 3y ago
      [deleted]
imoverclocked 3y ago
> The investigation continues to determine what manufacturing documents were used to authorize the opening and closing of the left MED plug during the rivet rework. I mean, there is already a ton of documentation and process surrounding the construction of an airplane. Adding more process doesn't safety make. Having a safety culture without the fear of retaliation, on the other hand, makes a world of difference.
- TillE 3y ago
  That line stood out to me, because it implies that no proper "manufacturing document" was used for the work. If that's true, that's very bad; unapproved maintenance procedures have been the cause of multiple crashes.
- seo-speedwagon 3y ago
  If the door was removed (which the NTSB report and the whistleblower post linked elsewhere around here say must have happened) there should be documentation for, at minimum, the removal and reattachment. If the door was not removed but was opened and closed, there should be documentation for both of those actions instead. I don't know if this should be considered "adding more process" because it has been standard process for a very long time. All work done on an airplane is authorized, by someone, and after completion is recorded, by someone. Discrepancies and deviations from this standard operating procedure are a big deal.

gowings97 3y ago

The data/photos should be in the ERP/MES.

ipython 3y ago

This is a puzzling attitude to me. Every time we technologists see a crappy proprietary solution being used for a problem, the first exclamation is, "why not use <commodity solution X>? That's so dumb, they spent $10k on that tool when they could have spent $100 on X!" There must be a middle ground here- the paradox is that Google, Apple, etc have this ability to generate user friendly software and hardware at scale. But they aren't considered "battle proven". The expensive proprietary systems that are used instead tend to be hard to use and brittle, so what's the middle ground?

deleted 3y ago
[deleted]
michael1999 3y ago
The issue here isn't using google chat, the accusation is that this was Spirit and Boeing conspiring to not record these in the proper work order system under the pretence that this work was being done by Spirit as-if-it-were pre-delivery. Read https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/146074-boeing-internal-whistleblower-re-max-door.html https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/146074-boeing-inte... And then this from the doc: "The investigation continues to determine what manufacturing documents were used to authorize the opening and closing of the left MED plug during the rivet rework." https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24410269/report_dca24ma063_193617_2_6_2024-2_15_12-pm.pdf https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24410269/report_dca24...
- ethbr1 3y ago
  A key point I read somewhere in the accusations is that non-Boeing contractors (e.g. Spirit) by policy cannot have access to CMES. Consequently, you have a system of record that a major party to work doesn't have access to. As we've all seen, this leads to "actual coordination" being instead done in a system all involved parties do have access to (SAT). Which inevitably leads to a desync between CMES (SOR by fiat) and SAT (SOR in practice).
  - calebpeterson 3y ago
    SOR - system of record SAT - ? CMES - ?
    - ethbr1 3y ago
      They're described in parent's first link. Boeing systems.
  - deleted 3y ago
    [deleted]
  - michael1999 3y ago
    But isn't that exactly the underlying fraud? Boeing and Spirit are conspiring to cover up Spirit's deficient delivery by allowing Spirit to work onsite at Renton and do post-delivery re-work and pretend that it is as-if delivered, and _outside_ Boeing's system of record. To reject the delivery and wait for Spirit to fix would ruin their delivery schedule, so they fudge it and muddle along. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-puts-more-boots-on-the-floor-at-renton-plant-as-boeing-slows-work/#:~:text=For%20years%2C%20Spirit%20AeroSystems%20has,Renton%20to%20do%20catchup%20work.&text=During%20the%20Quality%20Stand%20Down,ripple%20through%20the%20production%20line https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-p....
  - deleted 3y ago
    [deleted]

imoverclocked 3y ago

> The investigation continues to determine what manufacturing documents were used to authorize the opening and closing of the left MED plug during the rivet rework. I mean, there is already a ton of documentation and process surrounding the construction of an airplane. Adding more process doesn't safety make. Having a safety culture without the fear of retaliation, on the other hand, makes a world of difference.

TillE 3y ago
That line stood out to me, because it implies that no proper "manufacturing document" was used for the work. If that's true, that's very bad; unapproved maintenance procedures have been the cause of multiple crashes.
seo-speedwagon 3y ago
If the door was removed (which the NTSB report and the whistleblower post linked elsewhere around here say must have happened) there should be documentation for, at minimum, the removal and reattachment. If the door was not removed but was opened and closed, there should be documentation for both of those actions instead. I don't know if this should be considered "adding more process" because it has been standard process for a very long time. All work done on an airplane is authorized, by someone, and after completion is recorded, by someone. Discrepancies and deviations from this standard operating procedure are a big deal.