7 ms·

> You should always combine it with something only known to the user (i.e. a passphrase). The fact this isn't mandatory blows me away. I remember when my work

> You should always combine it with something only known to the user (i.e. a passphrase). The fact this isn't mandatory blows me away. I remember when my work machine first got TPM full disk encryption, a passphrase was needed. A few years later? Meh. Who needs "real" security. Of course I get it is a convenience trade off, it almost always is.

mschuster91 3y ago
It's especially because Microsoft doesn't want to deal with people who manage to forget their unlock code or those who die without having a break-glass kit deposited at a bank locker, leaving their relatives in quite the mess. I get it, for everyday people TPM-only is enough, but anyone remotely security-minded (or anyone traveling to the US and thus subject to the whims of the CBP) is better served with a good passphrase.
- tsimionescu 3y ago
  If CBP wants to know what's inside your laptop, and you're not an American citizen, your options are to show them or go back to where you came from, and possibly never be allowed back again. Missing a passphrase may mean you're not even presented with this option, though in principle you still should be asked even if the device were completely unlocked and unencrypted, but few would take the second option anyway, so for the majority of travellers, the passphrase is not really extra protection.
  - defrost 3y ago
    It's proven sufficient to show them what they expect to see. Variations on plausibly deniable rubberhose | TrueCrypt bare metal vmhosts allow for parallel OS's - one that can be booted by default and be "family friendly" with all the apps and photos | IMs etc expected and another (or many) OS's that have non obvious triggers to allow for passphrase entry into journalists document vaults. The evidence for parallel OS's is two fold:- * non obvious drivers almost always overlooked and essentially never noticed in border patrol scans, and * "unused" areas of drive storage with contents indistinguishable from white noise (or multi pass disk shredding).
    - tsimionescu 3y ago
      That is a while extra level above what was being suggested.

mschuster91 3y ago

It's especially because Microsoft doesn't want to deal with people who manage to forget their unlock code or those who die without having a break-glass kit deposited at a bank locker, leaving their relatives in quite the mess. I get it, for everyday people TPM-only is enough, but anyone remotely security-minded (or anyone traveling to the US and thus subject to the whims of the CBP) is better served with a good passphrase.

tsimionescu 3y ago
If CBP wants to know what's inside your laptop, and you're not an American citizen, your options are to show them or go back to where you came from, and possibly never be allowed back again. Missing a passphrase may mean you're not even presented with this option, though in principle you still should be asked even if the device were completely unlocked and unencrypted, but few would take the second option anyway, so for the majority of travellers, the passphrase is not really extra protection.
- defrost 3y ago
  It's proven sufficient to show them what they expect to see. Variations on plausibly deniable rubberhose | TrueCrypt bare metal vmhosts allow for parallel OS's - one that can be booted by default and be "family friendly" with all the apps and photos | IMs etc expected and another (or many) OS's that have non obvious triggers to allow for passphrase entry into journalists document vaults. The evidence for parallel OS's is two fold:- * non obvious drivers almost always overlooked and essentially never noticed in border patrol scans, and * "unused" areas of drive storage with contents indistinguishable from white noise (or multi pass disk shredding).
  - tsimionescu 3y ago
    That is a while extra level above what was being suggested.