7 ms·
Microsoft BitLocker in its most secure mode is the gold standard because it protects against more attack modes than other software. Unfortunately, Microsoft has
by kia 15y ago
Microsoft BitLocker in its most secure mode is the gold standard because it protects against more attack modes than other software. Unfortunately, Microsoft has only made it available with certain versions of Microsoft Windows.
Though MS says that BitLocker doesn't have back doors [1], I wonder how true this actually is...
[1] http://blogs.msdn.com/b/si_team/archive/2006/03/02/542590.aspx http://blogs.msdn.com/b/si_team/archive/2006/03/02/542590.as...
- sliverstorm 15y agoDo MS developers have a track record of bald-faced lies that I'm unaware of?
- dhbanes 15y agohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY
- slowpoke 15y agoExactly. Trusting proprietary, closed source software (in other words, a third party) for encryption is missing the point of encryption so hard, it's not even funny.
- jazzyb 15y agoTo be fair, I trust TrueCrypt because it's "libre" and "open", but I've never looked at the source code myself. I trust that other people more knowledgable than me have taken a look at it, but if there is indeed a backdoor in it, then it will look on the surface like the most innocuous bug in the world. Don't get me wrong: I understand and appreciate your point, but I honestly don't know how most of us using TrueCrypt (e.g. me) are any better off than those who use a proprietary solution. The only difference I can see is any backdoors in TrueCrypt or PGP must be better hidden.
- slowpoke 15y agoWhile you are basically correct, the mere ability to check the source yourself and possibly be able to find (or even fix) said bugs-which-could-or-could-not-be-cleverly-hidden-backdoors puts it leagues ahead of any proprietary solution, where there is never any way to be sure there isn't just something like a void force_decrypt(string company_master_password)[1] in there. And to be perfectly honest, I'd rather trust the FLOSS crowd who checked TrueCrypt and other more or less popular encryption tools probably hundreds, if not thousands of times than trust the development team of a company refusing to release the source of their software. [1] Yes, I am kidding, but I hope you catch my drift.
- Create 15y agobe reassured, that "nobody" actually checks thoroughly in practice, so don't rely on it. http://www.h-online.com/newsticker/news/item/Debian-package-of-OpenSSL-generates-weak-keys-735183.html http://www.h-online.com/newsticker/news/item/Debian-package-...
- 3pt14159 15y agoDoesn't that prove that people do check it? Isn't the point of open source that you can have problems for a time, but eventually you'll be ok? Certainly better than you could write yourself or trust in a closed source system.
- Create 15y agoYes, it is certainly easier to audit than binaries, but one of the main axioms in cryptography is, that it should ensure security for the timeframe until the information protected is still valuable (one can assume, that eventually all crypto is cracked -- the question is when, and how to delay this to ensure functionality). This bug was injected for two years: the damage has been done, with literally over a million of weak keys that pollute the internet. That said, I acknowledge, that the ssl system has (perhaps even more) serious weaknesses beyond the keys themselves. It should have been caught days after commit, and never should have made it into debian stable (and debian has a very slow, thorough release cycle). But telnetd comes to mind, etc. Perhaps only OpenBSD shows consistent true efforts in open source auditing.
- cmos 15y agoI'm pretty sure everything has a back door. I was a consultant writing test code for software that managed the license creation process for my state's DMV and we had two separate doors for the FBI and CIA. They could just type any information in they wanted to, upload a picture, hit print, and the process would mail them a drivers license like everyone else.
- mahyarm 15y agoThat is like an organizational intranet interface, not a backdoor. A backdoor would have to give access to an undesired third party by the end user.
- powertower 15y ago> Trusting proprietary, closed source software (in other words, a third party) for encryption is missing the point of encryption so hard, it's not even funny. I don't have the experience, knowledge, and time (+ effort) to review every source-code line and every theorem used by an encryption application ... to make sure it's not doing something it shouldn't. And (chances are) you don't either. So it's not about closed-source or open-source, but rather it's about trust.
- slowpoke 15y ago>So it's not about closed-source or open-source, but rather it's about trust. And that's my point. How can I trust someone who's unwilling to show me the source of their software and denies me my basic freedoms? What I am not saying is that Free Software should be blindly trusted - that would be stupid and reckless. What I am saying is that for security[1], proprietary software cannot and must not be trusted, under any circumstances. You cannot even verify what the program you are using does? It's not secure, full stop. And again, it's a massive difference between hiding a backdoor in a binary blob as opposed to essentially trying to hide it in plain sight. It's possible, but highly unlikely to go unnoticed for a prolonged amount of time. And if it is found, it will probably be fixed pretty much instantly as per Linus' Law. Finally, corporations and businesses are bound to law for the most part. If they are required (or ordered) to include a backdoor for the FBI or NSA, they will most likely have to oblige. Not so much for Free Software. You essentially cannot force such a backdoor since even if the original maintainers include it, the project will just be forked, and law enforcement - to put it bluntly - can't do shit against it. [1] And arguably everywhere else, too, but I'd prefer to stay on topic.