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You are talking about tipping points and those are most certainly covered and inserted into IPCC models. AMOC and permafrost has been covered in the most recent
by GoodJokes 4y ago
You are talking about tipping points and those are most certainly covered and inserted into IPCC models. AMOC and permafrost has been covered in the most recent report.
You either are getting your shit from Reddit or worse.
I highly question the veracity of your comment. It looks like copy pasta from one of climate subreddits.
- areoform 4y agoFYI, you've been shadow banned. I think it's mostly because your comments are needlessly confrontational. > You either are getting your shit from Reddit or worse. I am not going to state my bonafides here, but if you followed the citations, you would know that it's true. These tipping points are mentioned in the reports, but they are not included in the models. To quote the Woodwell Climate Research Center, > This is done using a simplified, preliminary estimate that both assumes a linear relationship between warming and permafrost emissions and excludes a number of critically important thaw processes—notably abrupt thaw (thaw-induced ground collapse that exposes deep permafrost) and fire-permafrost interactions. As a result, the projection (3–41 GtCO₂ per 1°C of warming by 2100) is underestimating permafrost carbon emissions potential in the budgets. Or straight from the horse's mouth, > Scientific advisers must resist pressures that undermine the integrity of climate science. Instead of spreading false optimism, they must stand firm and defend their intellectual independence, findings and recommendations — no matter how politically unpalatable2. and > Climate researchers who advise policy-makers feel that they have two options: be pragmatic or be ignored. They either distance themselves from the policy process by declaring that it is no longer possible to stay within a 2 °C-compatible carbon budget, or they suggest practical ways to dodge carbon-budget constraints3. > Many advisers are choosing pragmatism. This can lead to paradoxical positions, as exemplified by shifting assumptions in climate economics over the past few years. > Each year, mitigation scenarios that explore policy options for transforming the global economy are more optimistic4 — and less plausible. Advisers once assumed that the global emissions peak would have to be reached before 2020 and that annual emissions-reduction rates of more than 3% were not feasible. Those assumptions keep changing. > For example, the fourth assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 2007, stated that emissions must peak by 2015 to stay within 2 °C of warming; yet the fifth IPCC report, released last year, refers to 2030 emissions levels higher than today's that are still compatible with this limit, albeit with annual emissions-reduction rates of 6%. The annual Emissions Gap Report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) had an original deadline of 2020 for its analysis of how to fill the gap between global emissions levels compatible with a 2 °C target and national pledges; the 2014 edition extended it to 2030. > In both cases, climate economists got around past 'make-or-break' points for the 2 °C target by adding 'negative emissions' — the removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere during the second half of this century. Most models assume that this can be achieved using a combination of approaches known as BECCS: bioenergy (which would require 500 million hectares of land — 1.5 times the size of India)4 and carbon capture and storage, an unproven technology. and most damning of all, > “ Policy-makers view the IPCC reports mainly as a source of quotes with which to legitimize their preferences.” https://www.nature.com/articles/521027a https://www.nature.com/articles/521027a We are already far beyond the worst case scenario as shown by the initial reports. The models that power the graphs exclude many known feedback loops and include these types of hacks to achieve what people want.