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If you’re interested in learning about other metaphysical possibilities, George Berkeley’s works could be worth a read. One of his big statements is that “to be

If you’re interested in learning about other metaphysical possibilities, George Berkeley’s works could be worth a read. One of his big statements is that “to be is to be perceived” — that is, anything that cannot be perceived doesn’t actually exist. Berkeley makes a pretty decent argument for this and his work is fairly influential in the realm of metaphysics (UC Berkeley is named after him). I interpreted the original comment to mean that the mind is necessary for reality (i.e. there is no meaningful reality outside the mind), which is very close to what Berkeley is gesturing at. Either way, the questions you’re asking (which all themselves presuppose a certain metaphysical interpretation of the world) have interesting implications (it seems like what you’re driving at is similar to the mind-body problem). Hope you found this interesting!

mistermann 5y ago
> One of his big statements is that “to be is to be perceived” — that is, anything that cannot be perceived doesn’t actually exist. Berkeley makes a pretty decent argument for this... Do you know of where a person could read a summary of his argument?
- maxfan8 5y ago
  The original text is the best, I think (maybe look at Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy's treatment of the subject [1]). The way I like to think of Berkeley's position is like an equivalence argument. Suppose one is arguing that mind-independent objects exist (that is, there are things out there that cannot be perceived, but one claims to exist). Berkeley's conception of the world (in which such undetectable objects do not exist) is equivalent, at least from the perspective of any observer. Any mind/observer in the world, by construction, cannot perceive or detect (even indirectly) mind-independent objects. If they could, then those objects wouldn't be mind-independent. So a world in which mind-independent objects exist is indistinguishable from Berkeley's world. Does it really make sense when materialists argue that unobservable, undetectable, totally unperceivable and uninferrable things in this world actually exist? So, Berkeley argues that reality is actually contingent on our minds (and he tries to show that this isn't as big of a deal as it sounds). Berkeley's real argument goes a bit differently (as I understand it), but I think a claim of functional equivalence may be more convincing for people with a math/CS background. [1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/#2.1 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/#2.1
  - mistermann 5y ago
    > The way I like to think of Berkeley's position is like an equivalence argument. Suppose one is arguing that mind-independent objects exist (that is, there are things out there that cannot be perceived, but one claims to exist). Berkeley's conception of the world (in which such undetectable objects do not exist) is equivalent, at least from the perspective of any observer. Any mind/observer in the world, by construction, cannot perceive or detect (even indirectly) mind-independent objects. If they could, then those objects wouldn't be mind-independent. So a world in which mind-independent objects exist is indistinguishable from Berkeley's world. This seems like not a sound argument to me....is it not tautological, or, simply an observation that perception of reality does not necessarily match actual reality? If one was to imprison a child in a room from day one, they would have no way to perceive what is outside the room, yet multiple outside observers would agree in very high detail that certain specific things outside the room do exist. Does this scenario not consist of some sort of a reasonable disproof of this theory? And if the counter-argument is that the perception of the outsiders is what causes those objects to exist, if we then killed all of those outside observers (say, just a few researchers who are aware of what is in the room surrounding the child's room), would the objects in that room then cease to exist (and if so, by what mechanism that we reasonably know exists)? From your link: >> Berkeley presents here the following argument (see Winkler 1989, 138): >> (1) We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.). >> (2) We perceive only ideas. >> Therefore, >> (3) Ordinary objects are ideas. To me, the obvious flaw here is that there seems to be an implicit "only" perceived within the conclusion: "Ordinary objects are [only] ideas [and nothing else]." This is an extremely common error that the human mind makes, but you'd think that a philosopher would catch it in review of an idea (or the reviewers, who say: "The argument is valid, and premise (1) looks hard to deny."), so I feel like I must be missing something in the argument. > Does it really make sense when materialists argue that unobservable, undetectable, totally unperceivable and uninferrable things in this world actually exist? It makes complete sense to me (and I typically disagree with materialists)! > So, Berkeley argues that reality is actually contingent on our minds (and he tries to show that this isn't as big of a deal as it sounds). I 100% believe that reality is contingent on our minds, but I disagree extremely with the idea that this isn't a big of a deal - I think it might be the biggest (unrecognized) deal out there.

mistermann 5y ago

> One of his big statements is that “to be is to be perceived” — that is, anything that cannot be perceived doesn’t actually exist. Berkeley makes a pretty decent argument for this... Do you know of where a person could read a summary of his argument?

maxfan8 5y ago
The original text is the best, I think (maybe look at Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy's treatment of the subject [1]). The way I like to think of Berkeley's position is like an equivalence argument. Suppose one is arguing that mind-independent objects exist (that is, there are things out there that cannot be perceived, but one claims to exist). Berkeley's conception of the world (in which such undetectable objects do not exist) is equivalent, at least from the perspective of any observer. Any mind/observer in the world, by construction, cannot perceive or detect (even indirectly) mind-independent objects. If they could, then those objects wouldn't be mind-independent. So a world in which mind-independent objects exist is indistinguishable from Berkeley's world. Does it really make sense when materialists argue that unobservable, undetectable, totally unperceivable and uninferrable things in this world actually exist? So, Berkeley argues that reality is actually contingent on our minds (and he tries to show that this isn't as big of a deal as it sounds). Berkeley's real argument goes a bit differently (as I understand it), but I think a claim of functional equivalence may be more convincing for people with a math/CS background. [1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/#2.1 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/#2.1
- mistermann 5y ago
  > The way I like to think of Berkeley's position is like an equivalence argument. Suppose one is arguing that mind-independent objects exist (that is, there are things out there that cannot be perceived, but one claims to exist). Berkeley's conception of the world (in which such undetectable objects do not exist) is equivalent, at least from the perspective of any observer. Any mind/observer in the world, by construction, cannot perceive or detect (even indirectly) mind-independent objects. If they could, then those objects wouldn't be mind-independent. So a world in which mind-independent objects exist is indistinguishable from Berkeley's world. This seems like not a sound argument to me....is it not tautological, or, simply an observation that perception of reality does not necessarily match actual reality? If one was to imprison a child in a room from day one, they would have no way to perceive what is outside the room, yet multiple outside observers would agree in very high detail that certain specific things outside the room do exist. Does this scenario not consist of some sort of a reasonable disproof of this theory? And if the counter-argument is that the perception of the outsiders is what causes those objects to exist, if we then killed all of those outside observers (say, just a few researchers who are aware of what is in the room surrounding the child's room), would the objects in that room then cease to exist (and if so, by what mechanism that we reasonably know exists)? From your link: >> Berkeley presents here the following argument (see Winkler 1989, 138): >> (1) We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.). >> (2) We perceive only ideas. >> Therefore, >> (3) Ordinary objects are ideas. To me, the obvious flaw here is that there seems to be an implicit "only" perceived within the conclusion: "Ordinary objects are [only] ideas [and nothing else]." This is an extremely common error that the human mind makes, but you'd think that a philosopher would catch it in review of an idea (or the reviewers, who say: "The argument is valid, and premise (1) looks hard to deny."), so I feel like I must be missing something in the argument. > Does it really make sense when materialists argue that unobservable, undetectable, totally unperceivable and uninferrable things in this world actually exist? It makes complete sense to me (and I typically disagree with materialists)! > So, Berkeley argues that reality is actually contingent on our minds (and he tries to show that this isn't as big of a deal as it sounds). I 100% believe that reality is contingent on our minds, but I disagree extremely with the idea that this isn't a big of a deal - I think it might be the biggest (unrecognized) deal out there.