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https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/1423109002280513540 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/14231090022805135... and https://twitter.com/matthew_d
by __blockcipher__ 5y ago
https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/1423109002280513540 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/14231090022805135... and https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/1423109458293628931 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/14231094582936289... kind of sums it up. Clearly there is an intent to progress to more than just what's been shared with iCloud. Otherwise there'd be no need for software on the devices themselves at all.
- shuckles 5y agoThat is not the only explanation. Involving the device could be considered better because it doesn’t require Apple to build infrastructure to scan all your photos in the cloud, which could be more easily repurposed without user consent.
- pseudalopex 5y agoThey scan photos in the cloud now. And do you think Apple will announce and let users opt out of client side scanning changes?
- shuckles 5y agoAs far as is publicly known, only iCloud Mail was being scanned before this announcement. This is consistent with the lack of overall CyberTip reports from Apple historically (orders of magnitudes lower than comparable platforms).
- pseudalopex 5y agoArticles said Apple scanned iCloud photos last year. I see some of them were updated to be less specific.
- Terretta 5y agoThe slant I took from that thread is this is the way to comply with known-bad-hash matching requirement while preserving E2E encryption for cloud-stored content: checking hash at an end. Don’t need to MITM when you put an M at an end.
- pseudalopex 5y agoiCloud photos aren't E2E encrypted now. This could be a way to add E2E encryption while preserving the current level of surveillance. Except the article said Apple can decrypt suspect photos. And it isn't a legal requirement apparently.[1] [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28077619 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28077619