7 ms·

It looks like they are, but there might be a minor issue in verifying the content: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/10476 https://github.com/s

It looks like they are, but there might be a minor issue in verifying the content: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/10476 https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/10476 But despite best efforts by the community to verify builds, Google and Apple can be forced to upload a malicious app to a particular user, meaning they aren't using the same app at all.

morelisp 5y ago
If your threat model includes the ability to force Apple to do X, then Signal is irrelevant.
- ndiscussion 5y ago
  That's probably a good point, I'm using GrapheneOS which is not identifiable to Google/Apple and can't be singled out for updates.
greysonp 5y ago
> But despite best efforts by the community to verify builds, Google and Apple can be forced to upload a malicious app to a particular user, meaning they aren't using the same app at all. Hi there! Signal-Android developer here. App signing verification is done at the OS-level, and Google does not have our signing key, so they wouldn't be able to give an existing user a different APK and have it successfully install.
- ndiscussion 5y ago
  Is that really true? Couldn't Google forcibly turn off the code-signing requirement on an individual's phone? They've been known to reset passwords remotely in the past: https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/30/11330892/fbi-google-android-unlocking-phone-court-order https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/30/11330892/fbi-google-andro...
  - codethief 5y ago
    No, they could not. And if you don't want to trust $random_manufacturer's Android ROM, you could switch to GrapheneOS[0] whose developer Daniel Micay attaches a lot of importance to reliable app signatures (which is why GrapheneOS doesn't come with MicroG as the latter would need signature spoofing). [0]: https://grapheneos.org/ https://grapheneos.org/

7 ms·

It looks like they are, but there might be a minor issue in verifying the content: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/10476 https://github.com/s

by ndiscussion 5y ago

morelisp 5y ago
If your threat model includes the ability to force Apple to do X, then Signal is irrelevant.
- ndiscussion 5y ago
  That's probably a good point, I'm using GrapheneOS which is not identifiable to Google/Apple and can't be singled out for updates.
greysonp 5y ago
> But despite best efforts by the community to verify builds, Google and Apple can be forced to upload a malicious app to a particular user, meaning they aren't using the same app at all. Hi there! Signal-Android developer here. App signing verification is done at the OS-level, and Google does not have our signing key, so they wouldn't be able to give an existing user a different APK and have it successfully install.
- ndiscussion 5y ago
  Is that really true? Couldn't Google forcibly turn off the code-signing requirement on an individual's phone? They've been known to reset passwords remotely in the past: https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/30/11330892/fbi-google-android-unlocking-phone-court-order https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/30/11330892/fbi-google-andro...
  - codethief 5y ago
    No, they could not. And if you don't want to trust $random_manufacturer's Android ROM, you could switch to GrapheneOS[0] whose developer Daniel Micay attaches a lot of importance to reliable app signatures (which is why GrapheneOS doesn't come with MicroG as the latter would need signature spoofing). [0]: https://grapheneos.org/ https://grapheneos.org/