8 ms·
Reminds me of the Solaris TTYPROMPT in.telnetd bypass: https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/114491/Solaris-TTYPROMPT-Remote-Login-Bypass.html https://packetsto
by sslalready 6y ago
Reminds me of the Solaris TTYPROMPT in.telnetd bypass: https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/114491/Solaris-TTYPROMPT-Remote-Login-Bypass.html https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/114491/Solaris-TTYPROM...
- mkr-hn 6y agoDon't forget booting Linux in single user mode with a simple GRUB edit to bypass the login.
- SteveNuts 6y agoThis one makes sense to me, if someone has access to the console during boot, there's not much sense in preventing them from logging in. At that point they could just pull the drive and mount it in a different computer and replace passwd and shadow. If you want to prevent this you need full disk encryption
- vbezhenar 6y agoJust full disk encryption does not solve the problem fundamentally. Malicious user with physical access could just install keylogger into bootloader which would log the password on the next boot. To protect from that threat you need secure boot which verifies checksums from BIOS to kernel.
- rocqua 6y agoFull disk encryption alone suffices against device theft, presuming the device is turned off. More complicated threat models like an evil-maid attack are much harder to defend against. Secure boot, and temper-evident device seals, form the outline of a solution. As far as I know though, these are still far from foolproof. Really I would say defending from an evil maid attack is still an open problem. Something very similar holds for theft of devices that are still on.
- bizarref00l 6y agoReminds me of Solaris Stop A sequence.
- jojobas 6y agoThat was intentional. You could set a bootloader password since forever, but most people didn't want that.