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FWIW, and with minimal snark, they literally went all the way to SCOTUS to blur the line between the two.

rayiner 7y ago
That’s not quite the correct framing. The RFRA allows a “person” to sue the government where a law impinges on the person’s “exercise of religion.” Hobby Lobby involved two separate issues. One, does “person” for purposes of the RFRA include a corporation? The Court answered yes, that’s the usual meaning absent contrary intent. Two, is a privately held for profit corporation a “person” capable of "exercising religion?" DHHS conceded that non-profit corporations were capable of exercising religion. (The dissent did not dispute that either.) So the Court's decision was a straight-forward application of that concession, based on finding no reason why a for-profit corporation should be treated differently.[1] The underlying principle therefore wasn’t “blurry." Corporations have separate assets from their owners. But they are controlled and operated by people for various purposes. The government cannot use the fact that the inanimate entity lacks rights in order to indirectly impinge on the rights of the people who legally own and operate the corporation. That basic principle wasn't disputed by either DHHS or the dissent. The only issue was whether for-profit corporations should somehow be treated differently than non-profits. And that general principle is clearly correct. Thought experiment: can Donald Trump issue an executive order requiring Google to post in its front page a banner encouraging people to vote for him? If not, why not? Whose rights are violated? [1] I actually disagree with the DHHS's concession. Corporations can't "exercise religion." For this particular case the distinction ends up being academic, because that just means that the owners are the ones who should have brought the RFRA suit, not the corporation. The owners of Hobby Lobby definitely can exercise religion, and regulating a corporation they have the right to control can be an infringement of that right. As Kennedy noted in concurrence, the holding of the case is narrow.
- mannykannot 7y ago
  And how does the law go with regard to participation in criminal activity by a privately held corporation?
  - deleted 7y ago
    [deleted]
  - rayiner 7y ago
    It works similarly: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-criminal-charge-against-toyota-motor-corporation-and-deferred https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-.... Corporations can be held criminally liable. For that purpose, the mental state of the humans authorized to take action on behalf of the corporation is imputed onto the corporation. If Hobby Lobby's owners had intent to defraud customers, and directed the corporation to defraud customers, they could be held liable and so could the corporation. The fact that Hobby Lobby as an inanimate object is incapable of forming intent would be irrelevant.

That’s not quite the correct framing. The RFRA allows a “person” to sue the government where a law impinges on the person’s “exercise of religion.” Hobby Lobby involved two separate issues. One, does “person” for purposes of the RFRA include a corporation? The Court answered yes, that’s the usual meaning absent contrary intent. Two, is a privately held for profit corporation a “person” capable of "exercising religion?" DHHS conceded that non-profit corporations were capable of exercising religion. (The dissent did not dispute that either.) So the Court's decision was a straight-forward application of that concession, based on finding no reason why a for-profit corporation should be treated differently.[1] The underlying principle therefore wasn’t “blurry." Corporations have separate assets from their owners. But they are controlled and operated by people for various purposes. The government cannot use the fact that the inanimate entity lacks rights in order to indirectly impinge on the rights of the people who legally own and operate the corporation. That basic principle wasn't disputed by either DHHS or the dissent. The only issue was whether for-profit corporations should somehow be treated differently than non-profits. And that general principle is clearly correct. Thought experiment: can Donald Trump issue an executive order requiring Google to post in its front page a banner encouraging people to vote for him? If not, why not? Whose rights are violated? [1] I actually disagree with the DHHS's concession. Corporations can't "exercise religion." For this particular case the distinction ends up being academic, because that just means that the owners are the ones who should have brought the RFRA suit, not the corporation. The owners of Hobby Lobby definitely can exercise religion, and regulating a corporation they have the right to control can be an infringement of that right. As Kennedy noted in concurrence, the holding of the case is narrow.

mannykannot 7y ago
And how does the law go with regard to participation in criminal activity by a privately held corporation?
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
- rayiner 7y ago
  It works similarly: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-criminal-charge-against-toyota-motor-corporation-and-deferred https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-.... Corporations can be held criminally liable. For that purpose, the mental state of the humans authorized to take action on behalf of the corporation is imputed onto the corporation. If Hobby Lobby's owners had intent to defraud customers, and directed the corporation to defraud customers, they could be held liable and so could the corporation. The fact that Hobby Lobby as an inanimate object is incapable of forming intent would be irrelevant.