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As has been discussed on HN, this whole 737 MAX flaw is not a software problem. Boeing wants you to believe it is. The flaw is actually a physical design proble

As has been discussed on HN, this whole 737 MAX flaw is not a software problem. Boeing wants you to believe it is. The flaw is actually a physical design problem of the aircraft. Even if the software were to work perfectly, the plane is still flawed. The only real fix is not to fly the 737 MAX.

pratap103 7y ago
Or admit it's a hardware and aircraft design problem and go through the exponentially more expensive process of fixing it.
- tanakachen 7y ago
  What’s that old quote... “It Is Difficult to Get a Man to Understand Something When His Salary Depends Upon His Not Understanding It.”
  - liberte82 7y ago
    That explains so much.
ChrisRR 7y ago
It's a problem with the entire process. The hardware, software, safety as an option, lack of training, risk assessment, design, alarms that aren't easily identifiable, features that can't be over-ridden. There's issues throughout practically every step and they want people to believe that they're just going to push a software update and everything will be 100% fixed.
hef19898 7y ago
Yeah, it seems that Boeing hit a hard design limit with the 737 airframe. Main issue is the low ground clearance which makes it impossible, one could argue, to fit new engines. Which would mean that the 737 reached its end-of-life. That must scare the shit out of Boeing execs, and rightly so when your bread and butter product needs to be replaced by something new.
yread 7y ago
Aviation is about managing the risks. Even flawed airplane like 737NG (a 4 decades old airframe when designed, whole bunch of hacks from cockpit to elevator) can become very safe with 0.2 hull losses per million flights. The Classic had its rudder issue, it was fixed. This will also get fixed by a combination of engineering, code, checklists and training. It won't be cheap but it will get fixed
kuzehanka 7y ago
This is entirely false. Stop spreading disinformation. Myth: the 737 MAX 8 is not inherently stable, has relaxed stability, etc. Fact: it's very much inherently stable. Myth: the 737 MAX 8 is easier to stall than other planes. Fact: no it isn't. The pitch-up characteristic of the MAX 8 is less strong than of e.g. the 757 and that plane flies just fine. The actual problem with the MAX 8 is that Boeing added MCAS to allow it to share a type rating with the rest of the 737 family (allowing existing 737 pilots to fly the MAX 8 without additional training), and they fucked up MCAS. There's a number of solutions on the table, including removing rather than fixing MCAS and giving up the 737 type rating. I am continuously astounded that even on HN people are focusing on news cycle bullshit about inherent instability instead of the actual issues with Boeing/FAA that caused this situation. Evidence so far suggests that MCAS was originally a non-critical system that was found to be too weak during flight testing, and given significantly more pitch authority. For whatever reasons, this didn't trigger the reclassification of MCAS as a critical system and it all went downhill from there. Here's a pair of sources slightly more credible than the bullshit news cycle: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCphqjYZxxzjNbONVmY-0J7Q https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCphqjYZxxzjNbONVmY-0J7Q https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwpHKudUkP5tNgmMdexB3ow https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwpHKudUkP5tNgmMdexB3ow
- usrusr 7y ago
  > I am continuously astounded that even on HN people are focusing on news cycle bullshit about inherent instability instead of the actual issues with Boeing/FAA that caused this situation. How is it surprising that people are sceptical of claimed native flight characteristics after the way Boeing has handled communications after the crashes? I don't think that there are any independent facts around, even airline pilots who had been flying MAX from day one would not have much (if any) experience at the edges of the flight envelope. One data point we do know is that some people at Boeing were apparently very concerned about MCAS ever being off.
  - tjoff 7y ago
    Skeptical, absolutely! But it doesn't help to make up new facts.

pratap103 7y ago

Or admit it's a hardware and aircraft design problem and go through the exponentially more expensive process of fixing it.

tanakachen 7y ago
What’s that old quote... “It Is Difficult to Get a Man to Understand Something When His Salary Depends Upon His Not Understanding It.”
- liberte82 7y ago
  That explains so much.

ChrisRR 7y ago

It's a problem with the entire process. The hardware, software, safety as an option, lack of training, risk assessment, design, alarms that aren't easily identifiable, features that can't be over-ridden. There's issues throughout practically every step and they want people to believe that they're just going to push a software update and everything will be 100% fixed.

hef19898 7y ago

Yeah, it seems that Boeing hit a hard design limit with the 737 airframe. Main issue is the low ground clearance which makes it impossible, one could argue, to fit new engines. Which would mean that the 737 reached its end-of-life. That must scare the shit out of Boeing execs, and rightly so when your bread and butter product needs to be replaced by something new.

yread 7y ago

Aviation is about managing the risks. Even flawed airplane like 737NG (a 4 decades old airframe when designed, whole bunch of hacks from cockpit to elevator) can become very safe with 0.2 hull losses per million flights. The Classic had its rudder issue, it was fixed. This will also get fixed by a combination of engineering, code, checklists and training. It won't be cheap but it will get fixed

kuzehanka 7y ago

This is entirely false. Stop spreading disinformation. Myth: the 737 MAX 8 is not inherently stable, has relaxed stability, etc. Fact: it's very much inherently stable. Myth: the 737 MAX 8 is easier to stall than other planes. Fact: no it isn't. The pitch-up characteristic of the MAX 8 is less strong than of e.g. the 757 and that plane flies just fine. The actual problem with the MAX 8 is that Boeing added MCAS to allow it to share a type rating with the rest of the 737 family (allowing existing 737 pilots to fly the MAX 8 without additional training), and they fucked up MCAS. There's a number of solutions on the table, including removing rather than fixing MCAS and giving up the 737 type rating. I am continuously astounded that even on HN people are focusing on news cycle bullshit about inherent instability instead of the actual issues with Boeing/FAA that caused this situation. Evidence so far suggests that MCAS was originally a non-critical system that was found to be too weak during flight testing, and given significantly more pitch authority. For whatever reasons, this didn't trigger the reclassification of MCAS as a critical system and it all went downhill from there. Here's a pair of sources slightly more credible than the bullshit news cycle: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCphqjYZxxzjNbONVmY-0J7Q https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCphqjYZxxzjNbONVmY-0J7Q https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwpHKudUkP5tNgmMdexB3ow https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwpHKudUkP5tNgmMdexB3ow

usrusr 7y ago
> I am continuously astounded that even on HN people are focusing on news cycle bullshit about inherent instability instead of the actual issues with Boeing/FAA that caused this situation. How is it surprising that people are sceptical of claimed native flight characteristics after the way Boeing has handled communications after the crashes? I don't think that there are any independent facts around, even airline pilots who had been flying MAX from day one would not have much (if any) experience at the edges of the flight envelope. One data point we do know is that some people at Boeing were apparently very concerned about MCAS ever being off.
- tjoff 7y ago
  Skeptical, absolutely! But it doesn't help to make up new facts.