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Many package managers that support git as source allow to pin to a specific commit sha. That's as far as I can see a quite secure way to keep using an uncomprom

Many package managers that support git as source allow to pin to a specific commit sha. That's as far as I can see a quite secure way to keep using an uncompromised/verified version. It's not the most popular feature but people do it every now and then, probably it should be done more. I wonder if docker allows this and on the other hand if that's even feasible for say application images, given that applications must be updated a lot for security reasons. Of course if the Dockerfile's parent reference is not pinned, that does only help to some degree...

Polyisoprene 7y ago
You can pull an image using the sha: docker pull ubuntu@sha256:45b23dee08af5e43a7fea6c4cf9c25ccf269ee113168c19722f87876677c5cb2
- cyphar 7y ago
  Which effectively nobody does. Package managers and distribution packaging systems default to the safe method rather then defaulting to insecure rewritable tags. To be fair, the docker.io/library/* images are signed but no other images are and there are a bunch of issues with how the signing policies work for users that want to enforce that some images must be signed.
  - dlitz 7y ago
    The important thing is that tags are signed and up-to-date, like how git tags work or how Debian signs its entire repository as a unit (via the Release file) rather than having developers just sign individual packages. Otherwise, even if it's signed, it's subject to downgrade attacks. Installing known-vulnerable old versions of legitimate software can be just as bad as installing custom malware.
    - cyphar 7y ago
      Sure, that's how almost all package managers work. I can't think of a modern package manager from an "enterprise" distribution that didn't have a lot of the features of TUF[+]. And as I said, only official-library Docker images are signed. All other images are unsigned and even for third-party repos you can't force Docker to verify all images from a given repo (you have to enable it globally, which breaks the utility of a local "docker build"). [+] Arch is the only counterexample I can think of and I'm not even sure if my memory is correct.
  - sterlind 7y ago
    I do it! Everything I pull is pinned with sha256 since I use Nix/Kubenix, so I'm required to pin sha256 if I'm fetching from the Docker registry (or build the package deterministically myself.)
    - cyphar 7y ago
      The way image signing works with Docker is that there is a signature tying a tag to a sha256. If you use the sha256 directly you get immutable sources, but now your source isn't signed anymore -- how are you sure the hash is correct?
  - ownagefool 7y ago
    It's a bit of a pain, you need to build, push, pull, then get the sha. I suspect it would be done more if there was actually a decent UX for it.

Polyisoprene 7y ago

You can pull an image using the sha: docker pull ubuntu@sha256:45b23dee08af5e43a7fea6c4cf9c25ccf269ee113168c19722f87876677c5cb2

cyphar 7y ago
Which effectively nobody does. Package managers and distribution packaging systems default to the safe method rather then defaulting to insecure rewritable tags. To be fair, the docker.io/library/* images are signed but no other images are and there are a bunch of issues with how the signing policies work for users that want to enforce that some images must be signed.
- dlitz 7y ago
  The important thing is that tags are signed and up-to-date, like how git tags work or how Debian signs its entire repository as a unit (via the Release file) rather than having developers just sign individual packages. Otherwise, even if it's signed, it's subject to downgrade attacks. Installing known-vulnerable old versions of legitimate software can be just as bad as installing custom malware.
  - cyphar 7y ago
    Sure, that's how almost all package managers work. I can't think of a modern package manager from an "enterprise" distribution that didn't have a lot of the features of TUF[+]. And as I said, only official-library Docker images are signed. All other images are unsigned and even for third-party repos you can't force Docker to verify all images from a given repo (you have to enable it globally, which breaks the utility of a local "docker build"). [+] Arch is the only counterexample I can think of and I'm not even sure if my memory is correct.
- sterlind 7y ago
  I do it! Everything I pull is pinned with sha256 since I use Nix/Kubenix, so I'm required to pin sha256 if I'm fetching from the Docker registry (or build the package deterministically myself.)
  - cyphar 7y ago
    The way image signing works with Docker is that there is a signature tying a tag to a sha256. If you use the sha256 directly you get immutable sources, but now your source isn't signed anymore -- how are you sure the hash is correct?
- ownagefool 7y ago
  It's a bit of a pain, you need to build, push, pull, then get the sha. I suspect it would be done more if there was actually a decent UX for it.