5 ms·
It turns out the 10 passwords he 'hacked' were in the range of 1-6 characters. More details here: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/18/amazon_cloud_sha_pass
by markpercival 16y ago
It turns out the 10 passwords he 'hacked' were in the range of 1-6 characters.
More details here:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/18/amazon_cloud_sha_password_hack/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/18/amazon_cloud_sha_pas...
- blibble 16y agoIf he had just Google'd the hashes he'd have saved himself $2, considering there was no salting.
- tptacek 16y agoThe point is that "salting" doesn't slow down the GPU attack.
- pilif 16y agothe "attack" was using a dictionary. Salting would certainly defeat that, so he'd have to brute-force the key-space which would take years despite the parallel GPU power.
- tptacek 16y agoExactly how do you think a salt defeats a dictionary attack?
- cperciva 16y agothe "attack" was using a dictionary. Salting would certainly defeat that No.
- blibble 16y ago(in response to tptacek below) it doesn't help against a single hash, but for multiple hashes you scale up the amount of work required by the number of salts in use.
- tptacek 16y agoIf the observation made here was "this guy got unrealistically impressive results because he was able to parallelize across every password hash", I'd agree. But the observation was instead "this attack worked largely because the passwords weren't salted". No, false. This attack set a price of $1.62 per password using the simplest available GPU cluster resource. In no definition of cryptographic security is $1.62 a reasonable threshold. Scrypt, bcrypt, or PBKDF2 can increase that cost factor to many tens of thousands of dollars per password without incurring appreciable costs to the applications using it.