Consider what happens if an attack is detected after an election: As HN readers know, even if you know your systems have been penetrated it can be very difficu

Consider what happens if an attack is detected after an election: As HN readers know, even if you know your systems have been penetrated it can be very difficult to detect the extent of the damage: Which records have been changed? Deleted? Added? And what authority decides? We can expect that every party will produce experts who make claims in their parties' interests. Probably, we wouldn't know the accurate election results. What then? Rerun the election? * Is there a legal provision for that? What authority gets to decide that the democratic will of the people, the ultimate authority, is invalid and should be tested again? That is a very dangerous path to go down. * If the results change, you can imagine the response from the new losers and their supporters. * Who is to say the second election is valid? If the same machines are used, will the public trust them? Is there time to create a new national election infrastructure? Reporting a possible attack to the public could destabilize democracy and have no real resolution. As has been reported, intelligence agencies such as the Russian FSB may be more interested in destabilizing things than in a particular result. They could even purposely leave evidence of an attack, without carrying through with it (and of course hiding the true perpetrators). Based on that reasoning, it is absolutely essential that we prevent attacks. My very strong opinion is that a purely paper election is the only solution.