5 ms·

Have a look at piwik: http://piwik.org/ http://piwik.org/

sarciszewski 11y ago
I don't recommend Piwik. Using MD5 for passwords in 2015 is beyond irresponsible. https://github.com/piwik/piwik/blob/7f375924db9328f20a0b7cb1e41397f2309b60a7/core/Auth.php#L100 https://github.com/piwik/piwik/blob/7f375924db9328f20a0b7cb1... https://github.com/piwik/piwik/blob/6846145992278b52a2a35a8f040c39c3fb558b04/plugins/Login/Auth.php#L158 https://github.com/piwik/piwik/blob/6846145992278b52a2a35a8f...
- Karunamon 11y ago
  Eh. The analytics data is pretty low value as far as hacker targets, and this can be mostly mitigated anyways by sane segregation of the admin backend from the publicly accessible site. There's an open ticket for it, but it looks like it hasn't been addressed in a while since they don't want to break all existing passwords. https://github.com/piwik/piwik/issues/5728 https://github.com/piwik/piwik/issues/5728
  - sarciszewski 11y ago
    This is a solved problem. http://security.stackexchange.com/a/31439/43688 http://security.stackexchange.com/a/31439/43688 https://www.reddit.com/r/PHP/comments/3lwxlw/hash_and_verify_passwords_in_php_the_right_way/cva6y6p https://www.reddit.com/r/PHP/comments/3lwxlw/hash_and_verify...
  - ascorbic 11y ago
    A low value target maybe, but having a critical security ticket open for seven years is unforgivable. If they don't want to break compatibility it's pretty simple: use something like PHPass and upgrade the hash when the user next logs in. i.e. what every halfway sensible web app did at least five years ago.
  - jacquesm 11y ago
    It does not have to break all existing passwords. Just add an envelope for the old passwords.
- deleted 11y ago
  [deleted]
- ascorbic 11y ago
  Unbelievable. Unsalted MD5, no less. There's an issue to fix this that's been open for seven years! https://github.com/piwik/piwik/issues/5728 https://github.com/piwik/piwik/issues/5728
- onion2k 11y ago
  There's a $555 bounty if you can demonstrate a security vulnerability in Piwik because of that.
  - sarciszewski 11y ago
    I'm not interesting in further dehumanizing myself with participation in a bug bounty program. I'll write an exploit for it (the general case, not just Piwik in particular) and drop it on OSS Sec some day, but here's a theoretical attack: 1. Guess a username somehow. Maybe "admin"? Whatever, we're interested in the security of the hash function. Let's assume we have the username for our target. 2. Calculate a bunch of guess passwords, such that we have one hash output for each possible value for the first N hexits. e.g. substr(md5($string), 0, 2) === "00" substr(md5($string), 0, 2) === "01" substr(md5($string), 0, 2) === "02" // ... substr(md5($string), 0, 2) === "ff" 3. Send these guess passwords repeatedly and use timing information to get an educated guess on the first valid MD5 hash. 4. Iterate steps 2 and 3 until you have the first N bytes of the MD5 hash for the password. 5. Use offline methods to generate password guesses against a partial hash. The end result: A timing attack that consequently allows an optimized offline guess. So even if their entire codebase is immune to SQL injection, you can still launch a semi-blind cracking attempt against them.
    - sarciszewski 11y ago
      By the way, if anyone else wants to try to claim the $555 from Piwik based on the above theoretical attack, feel free.
    - frik 11y ago
      How to protect from timing attacks - It's All About Time: http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2014/11/its-all-about-time.html http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2014/11/its-all-about-time.html
      - sarciszewski 11y ago
        password_verify() compares hashes in constant-time, so, yeah...

I don't recommend Piwik. Using MD5 for passwords in 2015 is beyond irresponsible. https://github.com/piwik/piwik/blob/7f375924db9328f20a0b7cb1e41397f2309b60a7/core/Auth.php#L100 https://github.com/piwik/piwik/blob/7f375924db9328f20a0b7cb1... https://github.com/piwik/piwik/blob/6846145992278b52a2a35a8f040c39c3fb558b04/plugins/Login/Auth.php#L158 https://github.com/piwik/piwik/blob/6846145992278b52a2a35a8f...

Karunamon 11y ago
Eh. The analytics data is pretty low value as far as hacker targets, and this can be mostly mitigated anyways by sane segregation of the admin backend from the publicly accessible site. There's an open ticket for it, but it looks like it hasn't been addressed in a while since they don't want to break all existing passwords. https://github.com/piwik/piwik/issues/5728 https://github.com/piwik/piwik/issues/5728
- sarciszewski 11y ago
  This is a solved problem. http://security.stackexchange.com/a/31439/43688 http://security.stackexchange.com/a/31439/43688 https://www.reddit.com/r/PHP/comments/3lwxlw/hash_and_verify_passwords_in_php_the_right_way/cva6y6p https://www.reddit.com/r/PHP/comments/3lwxlw/hash_and_verify...
- ascorbic 11y ago
  A low value target maybe, but having a critical security ticket open for seven years is unforgivable. If they don't want to break compatibility it's pretty simple: use something like PHPass and upgrade the hash when the user next logs in. i.e. what every halfway sensible web app did at least five years ago.
- jacquesm 11y ago
  It does not have to break all existing passwords. Just add an envelope for the old passwords.
deleted 11y ago
[deleted]
ascorbic 11y ago
Unbelievable. Unsalted MD5, no less. There's an issue to fix this that's been open for seven years! https://github.com/piwik/piwik/issues/5728 https://github.com/piwik/piwik/issues/5728
onion2k 11y ago
There's a $555 bounty if you can demonstrate a security vulnerability in Piwik because of that.
- sarciszewski 11y ago
  I'm not interesting in further dehumanizing myself with participation in a bug bounty program. I'll write an exploit for it (the general case, not just Piwik in particular) and drop it on OSS Sec some day, but here's a theoretical attack: 1. Guess a username somehow. Maybe "admin"? Whatever, we're interested in the security of the hash function. Let's assume we have the username for our target. 2. Calculate a bunch of guess passwords, such that we have one hash output for each possible value for the first N hexits. e.g. substr(md5($string), 0, 2) === "00" substr(md5($string), 0, 2) === "01" substr(md5($string), 0, 2) === "02" // ... substr(md5($string), 0, 2) === "ff" 3. Send these guess passwords repeatedly and use timing information to get an educated guess on the first valid MD5 hash. 4. Iterate steps 2 and 3 until you have the first N bytes of the MD5 hash for the password. 5. Use offline methods to generate password guesses against a partial hash. The end result: A timing attack that consequently allows an optimized offline guess. So even if their entire codebase is immune to SQL injection, you can still launch a semi-blind cracking attempt against them.
  - sarciszewski 11y ago
    By the way, if anyone else wants to try to claim the $555 from Piwik based on the above theoretical attack, feel free.
  - frik 11y ago
    How to protect from timing attacks - It's All About Time: http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2014/11/its-all-about-time.html http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2014/11/its-all-about-time.html
    - sarciszewski 11y ago
      password_verify() compares hashes in constant-time, so, yeah...