> Another perspective on iMessage -- one I've heard from some attorney friends -- is that key server tampering sounds like a pretty good compromise solution to

> Another perspective on iMessage -- one I've heard from some attorney friends -- is that key server tampering sounds like a pretty good compromise solution to the problem of creating a 'secure golden key' (AKA giving governments access to plaintext).... I see two problems with this view. First, tampering with the key server fundamentally betrays user trust, and undermines most of the guarantees offered by iMessage. That horse has left the barn already. Services like OnStar have been repeatedly used and abused by law enforcement; once the service is created, the government gets a warrant (sometimes?) and undermines the service without any regard for the trust in company providing the service. We are not likely to be able to change that reality without a serious overhaul/oversight of the government's warrant scope and process.